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"We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon
others for our means of livelihood, and most of our people have
become completely dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs
they lose every resource, except for the relief supplied by the
various forms of social security. Such dependence of the mass of
the people upon others for all of their income is something new in
the world. For our generation, the substance of life is in another
man's hands."1
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States today, approximately ninety million persons
are employed in nonagricultural jobs in the private sector.3 Approxi-
mately sixty million are "at-will"4 employees who enjoy no statutory
protection from wrongful dismissal by their employers.5  It is
3. Current Labor Statistics, 115 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 80 thl. 19 June 1992) (estimating that
108 million people are employed in United States today).
4. Employment "at will" is terminable by either party (employer or employee) at his or her
pleasure, for cause or without cause, absent either a contractual or statutory provision stating
otherwise. See 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 43 (1969) ("[When the employment is not
for a definite term and there is no contractual or statutory restriction upon the right of
discharge, an employer may lawfully discharge an employee whenever and for whatever cause
he chooses without incurring liability.").
5. TheodoreJ. St. Antoine, The Model Emplyrnent Termination Act: A Threat to Management
or a Long-Overdue Employee Right?, 1993 PROC. OF N.Y.U. 45TH ANN. NAT'L CONF. ON LAB. 270;
Jack Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment-At-Wil4 36 LAB. LJ. 557, 558 (1985); Comment,
Comparing Kansas Employment-at-Will Law with the Model Employment Termination Act, 41 KAN. L.
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estimated that at least two million at-will employees are discharged by
their employers each year.6 Of those so discharged, 200,000 or more
are wrongfully terminated.7 That is, the termination is not justified
by some nondiscriminatory business reason that would meet the
standard of 'Just cause" or "good cause."'
REV. 169, 170 (1992). The statistics were originally developed in a study done by Professor
Stieber. SeeJack Stieber & Michael Murray, Protection Against Unjust Overcharge: The Need for a
Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L REF. 319, 322 (1983) (estimating number of employees
wrongfully discharged each year by extrapolating from U.S. Bureau of Labor statistics).
6. St. Antoine, supra note 5, at 270; cf. MONTHLY LAB. REV., supra note 3, at 73 tbl. 8. In
1990, a total of 2.3 million persons lost their jobs involuntarily for reasons other than layoff.
In 1991, the number increased to 3.3 million. MONTHLY LAB. REV., supra.
7. MODEL UNIFORM EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT prefatory note, reprinted in 9A Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 21, 23 (Aug. 8, 1991) [hereinafter MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT]
(estimating that 150,000 to 200,000 of two million at-will employees discharged each year would
have valid claims under "good cause" standard);Jack Stieber, The CaseforProtection of Unorganized
Employees Against UnfairDischarge 32 PROC. ANN. MEETING INDUs. REL. RES. ASS'N, 160-61 (1980);
Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the 1980's: A Look Ahead-The Experts Predict, 224 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) 25 (Nov. 19, 1982).
8. "Just cause" is the common standard that must be met to support a discharge under the
terms of most collective bargaining agreements. SeeWLLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM:
THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 63 (1993) (noting that such
protection exists in "approximately 95% of the collective bargaining agreements negotiated in
the United States"). "Good cause," which is substantially the same as "just cause," is the standard
used in the Model Employment Termination AcL See infra notes 258-86 and accompanying text
(explaining "good cause" standard adopted by Model Act).
Two cases are illustrative of the range of circumstances surrounding discharge without just
cause. The first is the story of Catherine Wagenseller, a former nurse at the Scottsdale
Memorial Hospital in Arizona. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz.
1985). Ms. Wagenseller began work in 1975 as a staff nurse after she was personally recruited
by Kay Smith, the manager of the emergency department. In 1978, Ms. Wagenseller was
assigned to the position of ambulance charge nurse. A year later, she was promoted to the
position of paramedic coordinator, a newly created management position. Id. at 1029.
Ms. Wagenseller'sjob performance evaluations had been consistently favorable. In early 1979,
for example, Kay Smith had rated Ms. Wagenseller's performance as "exceed[ing] results
expected," which was the second highest of five possible ratings. Id.
Her demise began in May 1979, when Ms. Wagenseller and Ms. Smith, who had enjoyed a
friendly, professional relationship,joined a group of personnel from other hospitals for a rafting
trip. During the trip, "an uncomfortable feeling" developed between the two women, which Ms.
Wagenseller believed to be the result of Ms. Smith's unusual behavior. The behavior included
public urination and bathing, heavy drinking, and "grouping up" with other rafters. Ms.
Wagenseller did not participate in any of the activities. In addition, she refused to participate
in the group's parody of the song "Moon River," in which members of the group allegedly
concluded by "mooning" the audience. Allegedly, the skit was repeated later at the Hospital,
where Ms. Wagenseller again refused to participate. Id.
The relationship between Ms. Smith and Ms. Wagenseller began to deteriorate following Ms.
Wagenseller's refusal to participate in the described activities. According to Ms. Wagenseller,
following the river trip, Ms. Smith began to harass her, use abusive language with her, and
embarrass her in the company of other staff. Other personnel reported a similar change in Ms.
Smith's behavior toward Ms. Wagenseller after the trip, although Ms. Smith denied it. Id.
On November 1, 1979, Ms. Wagenseller was fired. No other circumstances of her
employment had changed, other than her relationship with Ms. Smith. The Arizona Supreme
Court reversed the decision below granting summary judgment in favor of the employer, id. at
1044, holding that an employer may fire an at-will employee for good cause or no cause, but not
for bad cause, i.e., that which violates public policy, id. at 1033.
A second illustration of discharge withoutjust cause is the case ofJoseph Murphy, an assistant
treasurer of the American Home Products Corporation before his discharge in 1980. Murphy
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The human tragedy wrought by such wrongful terminations is
immeasurable. In American culture, as in many others, we identify
ourselves and find value in ourselves through our work. We introduce
ourselves as teachers, laborers, carpenters, engineers, bricklayers,
steelworkers, and even lawyers and law professors. Being gainfully
employed thus is more than a means of earning a living: it is essential
to our very "existence and dignity."9
It is therefore not surprising that many employees suffer severe
emotional trauma when they are discharged.' That distress fre-
quently affects relationships with families and friends, and may cause
v. American Home Prods., 448 N.E.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. 1983). Mr. Murphy began working for the
company in 1957. He served in various accounting positions and was ultimately promoted to
the office of assistant treasurer. Id. at 87.
Prior to his discharge, Mr. Murphy allegedly uncovered improprieties in corporate accounting
in which corporate personnel illegally manipulated at least $50 million of secret pension
reserves. The manipulation of the reserves inflated the company's growth in inrome and
allowed high-ranking officers to receive unwarranted bonuses from a managemern incentive
plan. In accordance with internal company regulations, Mr. Murphy reported the discrepancy.
He also refused to participate in the alleged scheme. Thereafter, on April 18, 1980, at the age
of 59, after 23 years with the company, he was fired. Id. The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal of Murphy's claims, refusing to recognize any exception to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine. Id. at 89-90.
9. William B. Gould, IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and
Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 892. Professor Gould further observed:
One's job provides not only income essential to the acquisition of the necessities of
life, but also the opportunity to shape the aspirations of one's family, aspirations which
are both moral and educational. Along with marital relations and religion, it is hard
to think of what might be viewed as more vital in our society than the opportunity to
work and retain one's employment status.
Id.; see also John D. Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of
Employment At Will, 17 AM. BUS. LJ. 467, 481 n.64 (1980) ("The question ofjob security is the
most important factor in the life of a worker.").
Professor Charles Reich has argued in a similar vein that our society is becoming one based
.upon relationship and status." Reich, supra note 2, at 785. That status is derived primarily
from our "source of livelihood." Id. "Status is so closely linked to personality that destruction
of one may well destroy the other." Id. He concludes, therefore, that status should be
surrounded by the safeguards once reserved for personality. Id.; see also PAUL C. WEILER,
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 3 (1990) ("[T]he
plants and offices in which we work are the places where we spend much of our adult lives,
where we develop important aspects of our personalities and our relationships, and where we
may be exposed to a variety of physical or psychological traumas.").
10. SeeAndrew Hacker, Introduction to THE CORPORATION TAKE-OVER 9 (Andrew Hacker ed.,
1964) ("[W]hite collar employees ... are psychologically unprepared for the loss of security and
status following.. . unemployment."); Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 1404, 1413 (1967)
(observing that social stigma and mental anguish are normal consequences of being fired);
Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a fiduciary Duty
to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189, 1198 (1991) ("[U]nemployment often causes
serious psychological and medical problems.") (citing B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA: PLANT CLOSINGS, COMMUNIIY ABANDONMENT, AND THE
DISMANTLING OF BASIC INDUSTRY 62 (1982)).
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permanent harm to those support networks." At its worst, the
trauma can result in permanent incapacity or even death. 2 The
consequences of employment termination have been vividly described
by Professor John D. Blackburn:
The societal costs of maintaining the terminable at will practice may
manifest themselves in a variety of ways. Even assuming that an
employer may immediately find a substitute for a wrongfully dis-
charged employee, the discharged employee will usually qualify for
governmentally distributed unemployment insurance. If the dis-
charged employee fails to find suitable employment, he or she may
become a public charge or even lead a life of crime. On a more
personal level, the mental and social consequences to the dis-
charged employee and the immediate family may be as severe as
they are immeasurable. The question of job security is the most
important factor in the life of a worker. The feeling of insecurity
not only may be detrimental to the moral, mental and material
development of an individual but it may also cause the deteriora-
tion of the moral and mental standards of the worker which in turn
may cause or contribute to so many complex social problems.
In addition, the discharged employee suffers adverse economic
consequences due to the loss of wages. Employees may receive
severance benefits from their employers, but these are not guaran-
teed. 4 Even when benefits are available, they do not begin to
replace lost wages, 5 and they are of limited duration. 6 Employees
11. See St. Antoine, supra note 5, at 270 (citing H. BRENNER, ESTIMATING THE SOCIAL COSTs
OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH AND CLINICAL
AGGRESSION (1976) (discussing mental and physical problems that may result from losing one's
job as well as effects on social and family relationships)); see also Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that ability to work and being employed are
essential to ability to provide for one's family).
12. See St. Antoine, supra note 5, at 270 ("Numerous studies document the increases in
cardiovascular deaths, suicides, mental breakdowns, alcoholism, ulcers, spouse and child abuse,
and impaired social relationships that follow in the wake of a job loss.").
13. Blackburn, supra note 9, at 481 n.64.
14. There is no federal statutory requirement for the payment of severance pay to
discharged workers. Some states require the payment of severance pay to employees in the
private sector who are terminated as a result of a change in corporate control, see, e.g., MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 183 (West 1994) (providing for severance pay equal to twice
employee's weekly compensation multiplied by her years of service for certain employees
terminated as result of corporate acquisition), and public employees may be entitied to
severance pay in the event of a reduction in force, see, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-18-622 (1993)
(providing for one to two weeks severance pay for state employees terminated because of
reduction in force).
15. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3313(b) (Supp. 1992) (setting minimum for weekly
benefit claims filed for unemployment compensation at $20 and maximum at $205); 43 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 804 (1991) (setting maximum weekly benefit at $205).
16. To be eligible for unemployment compensation, an individual must file a claim with the
state agency, and these claims are only valid for a "benefit year." See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 19, §
3314(2) (5) (1985) (setting forth criteria to receive unemployment compensation); 43 PA. CONS.
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who have lost their jobs and have had their incomes reduced
obviously have less money to spend as consumers. Wrongful
discharge, therefore, also adversely affects the economy at large.
17
Employers, too, suffer in the long run. Wrongful discharge simply
does not make good economic sense.18 Employee morale is nega-
tively affected by the observation of unjust firings.1 9 Employees will
wonder whether theirjobs are also at risk. Consequently, productivity
and employee attitudes may suffer. The result is a direct impact on
bottom-line profitability.
20
The law has been extraordinarily slow to respond to the issue of
wrongful discharge. Even though the United States has more than
fifty years of experience regulating employment through state and
STAT. ANN. § 801 (1991) (listing qualifications to receive unemployment benefits, including
filing "application for benefits with respect to the benefit year"); see also DEL- CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 3302(3) (1985) (defining "benefit year"); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 753(b) (1991) (defining
"benefit year").
17. See supra text accompanying note 13 (quoting Professor Blackburn's conclusions on
impact that discharge of employee may have on society and economy) (citing E. WIGHT BAKKE,
CmzENs WITHOUTWORK (1940) and ELMER H.JOHNSON, CRIME, CORRECTION, AND SOCIETY (4th
ed. 1978)). Professor Blackburn noted that these sociological studies had addressed problems
arising generally from unemployment, rather than dealing specifically with results of wrongful
discharge. Id.
18. Studies have shown "[m]arked correlations... between a secure workforce and high
productivity and quality output." St. Antoine, supra note 5, at 273 (citing FOULKs, LARGE
NONUNIONIZED EMPLOYERS IN U.S. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 1950-1980: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
129, 134-36, 141-44, 155-56 (Jack Stieber et al. eds., 1981); see also RICHARD T. PASCALE &
ANTHONY G. ATHOS, THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT: APPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN
EXECUTIVES 86 (1981) (observing thatAmerican corporate leaders are slowly changing their view
of employees as "primarily interchangeable parts and units of production," and are expanding
workers' responsibilities to decrease expensive personnel problems); MODEL EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATION Acr, supra note 7, prefatory note at 23 (identifying significant economic effects
of wrongful discharge, such as "creation of elaborate personnel procedures, internal grievance
systems, and the retention by risk-averse employers of unproductive employees"); Note, Employer
Opportunism and the Need for ajust Cause Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 510, 518 (1989) (suggesting
that lowered employee morale and litigation costs negatively affect long-term profits); cf.
O'Connor, supra note 10, at 1209 (suggesting that if firm breaches implicit contracts with its
employees, "worker distrust will develop, resulting in lower employee morale, productivity, and
loyalty," and that "once a firm acquires a dishonorable reputation, employees may quit, causing
the firm to incur costs recruiting replacements").
19. S. Olive Mastry, Speak No EviL The Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts Self-Publication
Defamation: Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 71 MINN. L. REV.
1092, 1112 (1987) ("[T]ermination without stated reasons not only frustrates employees, it also
lowers employee morale and effort in subsequent employment because of insecurity and a fear
of future termination for some unknown fault or shortcoming.");Julie Brandfield, Note, Undue
Hardship: TitleloftheAmericans with Disabilities Ac 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 113, 130 (1990) ("[T]he
firing or moving of an employee from a particular job could materially decrease morale.").
20. See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis IL Nolan, Toward a Theory of 7ust Cause" in Employee
Discipline Cases, 1985 DuKE L.J. 594, 602 (noting that wrongful discharge creates employee
dissatisfaction, which makes it difficult to hire and retain qualified employees and may impose
'significant costs" on employer who must find, employ, and train replacement for terminated
employee).
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federal legislation,2 1 not until the 1970s and 1980s22 did courts
begin to recognize exceptions to the historical, and uniquely
American,23 employment-at-will rule. Only then did employees begin
to experience success in suits against their employers for wrongful dis-
charge.24 At present, many states still provide little or no judicially
recognized protection for employees.' In the legislative arena,
Montana is the only state that has adopted a statute to protect
employees from wrongful discharge.
21. See, e.g., Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988) (establishing rights of railway
and air carrier employees to join labor organizations and bargain collectively, and setting forth
procedures for orderly resolution of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988) (extending to all
employees employed by employer whose business affects commerce right to form andjoin labor
organizations and to bargain collectively, and creating National Labor Relations Board to
administerAct and to prosecute violations thereof); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 160-169a (McKinney 1986)
(defining number of hours that constitute legal day's work and requiring one day of rest per
week for employees); NewYork Minimum Wage Act, N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 650-665 (McKinney 1988
& Supp. 1994) (establishing minimum hourly wage rates and empowering commissioner to
investigate disputes arising under Act); Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 951-963 (1991) (declaring that public policy of Pennsylvania is to foster employment
of all individuals "in accordance with their fullest capacities regardless of their race, color,
religious creed, ancestry, handicap, or disability" and recognizing civil right to obtain and hold
employment free of such discrimination).
22. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1033 (Ariz. 1985)
(adopting public-policy exception to employment-at-will doctrine); Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill. 1981) (holding that employee stated cause of action
for wrongful discharge when he claimed that he was fired for supplying information to police
for investigation of alleged criminal actions of co-worker); Touissantv. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980) (avoiding at-will doctrine by finding implied contract terms
in employers' policy statements and course of conduct); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d
549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (implying "covenant of good faith and fair dealing" in employment
agreements and holding that employer cannot fire at-will employee in "bad faith or malice or
based on retaliation"). See generally GOULD, supra note 8, at 66-80 (describing erosion of at-will
doctrine).
23. Over 60 countries, including Sweden, Norway, Canada, Japan, and the European
Community, as well as countries in South America, Africa, and Asia, provide statutory protection
from wrongful discharge. St. Antoine, supra note 5, at 272.
24. See, e.g., Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 438 N.E.2d 351, 355-56 (Mass.
1982) (holding that firing employee to avoid paying employee commission demonstrated bad
faith and holding employer liable for amount employee reasonably expected to be paid as
commissions during employment); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1332-34
(Cal. 1980) (holding that employer who fired employee for refusing to comply with employer's
request to engage in unlawful conduct violated public policy and that employer may be liable
for compensatory tort damages and punitive damages); Touissant, 292 N.W.2d at 890 (holding
that employer's "express agreement to terminate only for cause" or promise to do so implied
from company's policies and procedure, could give rise to right enforceable in contract).
25. There are three major recognized exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine: the
existence of an implied contract, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. See infra notes 84-126 and
accompanying text (explaining generally recognized exceptions to at-will doctrine). Forty-seven
states have now adopted at least one of the three exceptions. 9A Individual Employee Rights
Man. (BNA) 505:51-52 (1994). Only eight states, however, recognize all three. Twenty-five states
recognize only two of the exceptions. Id.; see also GOULD, supra note 8, at 67.
26. Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914
(1993). The Montana Code provides:
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In 1987, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) established a Drafting Committee for the
purpose of creating a Uniform Employment Termination Act to
provide employees with statutory protection against wrongful
discharge.2' The Drafting Committee presented the first draft of the
A discharge is wrongful only if:
(1) it was in retaliation for the employee's refusal to violate public policy or for
reporting a violation of public policy,
(2) the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the
employer's probationary period of employment; or
(3) the employer violated the express provisions of its own written personnel policy.
Id. § 39-2-904. A few state statutes give employees limited rights, but they fall far short of
protection against unjust dismissal. Missouri, for example, requires a corporation to provide any
employee who has voluntarily quit or who has been discharged after at least 90 days of
employment, with a letter explaining "the nature and character of service rendered by such
employee to such corporation and duration thereof, and truly stating for what cause, if any, such
employee was discharged or voluntarily quit such service." Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.140 (1993).
The rule apparently does not apply to non-corporate enterprises.
In South Carolina, the Commissioner of Labor mediates disputes in wrongful discharge cases
and all other industrial disputes, strikes, or lockouts. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-17-10 to 41-17-70
(Law. Co-op. 1986). In 1978, for example, there were 3129 complaints, 2621 of which involved
involuntary terminations. Ninety-two percent of all complaints were resolved. Stieber & Murray,
supra note 5, at 335 n.98.
South Dakota restricts the employment-at-will doctrine by changing the presumption of the
term of employment. Employment can be terminated at will only if the employee was not hired
for a specified term. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 60-4-5 (1978). An employer who wishes to
terminate such an employee must show that the discharge is justified by "habitual neglect of
duty or continued incapacity to perform or any willful breach of duty by the employee in the
course of his employment." Id.
Many states have enacted statutes protecting whistleblowers, i.e., employees who report to the
government or their superiors some wrongdoing or questionable act of their employer. See e.g.,
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428 (West 1989) (prohibiting employer from threatening, discharging,
or otherwise discriminating against employee who is about to report violation of law by
employer); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52 (1991) (prohibiting employers from disciplining
or taking retaliatory action against employee who reports violation of state or federal statute,
ordinance, or regulation by another employee or his employer). Some states also protect
against retaliation when an employee files a workmen's compensation claim, or when the
employee complies with a subpoena or serves on ajury. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-80 (Law
Co-op. Supp. 1993) (stating that employee is entitled to lost wages and reinstatement if
wrongfully discharged by employer because employee brought claim under South Carolina
Workers' Compensation Law or testified in compensation case); id. § 41-1-70 (providing that any
employer who discharges or demotes employee for complying with subpoena or testifying in
court proceeding is subject to civil action). Interestingly, California has codified the at-will
doctrine. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (providing that either party may
terminate employment which is subject to no specified term merely by providing notice to other
party). For a thorough discussion of state statutes, see Stieber & Murray, supra note 5, at 334-36.
27. The Drafting Committee, chaired by Stanley M. Fisher of Cleveland, Ohio, held its first
full working session in February 1988. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7,
prefatory note at 22.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was organized in the
1890s in response to a movement by the American Bar Association for reform and unification
of American law. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 355 (1973). There are
currently 99 uniform acts and 24 model acts on the NCCUSL's list, along with 12 other
recommended acts. One hundred forty-one other statutes have been withdrawn because they
were obsolete or have been superseded. WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE:.
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Act to the NCCUSL in August 1989.28 Two years later, in August
1991, the NCCUSL scheduled the presentation of the third and final
draft of the proposed Uniform Employment Termination Act.29 At
that meeting, much to the surprise of many observers, the commis-
sioners approved the statute.30 Because the commissioners were
sharply divided on the substance of the statute and could not reach
consensus on adopting it as a uniform act,31 however, they approved
A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS 130 (1991). For a general discussion of the operation of the NCCUSL, seeJames w. Day,
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 8 FLA. L. REV. 276 (1955).
28. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, prefatory note at 22. The
Drafting Committee met three times in 1988 and 1989. Each meeting produced a new or
completely revised draft of the Model AcL Id.
29. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, prefatory note at 22. Betweenthe
first reading in August 1989 and the second reading in July 1990, there were two additional
working sessions of the Committee that produced two additional drafts. Additional working
sessions in 1990 and 1991 yielded further new drafts. The third and final reading took place
at the 100th Annual Meeting of the NCCUSL in August 1991. The Model Act was formally
approved on August 8, 1991. Id. at 21.
30. Model Employment Termination Act's Adoption Seen as Surprise, Creating Controversy, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at A-2 (Aug. 13, 1991). The adoption of the Model Act was characterized
as a "fairly amazing turnaround." Id. At a 1990 meeting of the American Bar Association,
attorneys had "put chances of passage at 'zero to nil.'" Id.
31. The NCCUSL generally promulgates uniform acts in areas of law in which it believes
that uniformity among the states is desirable. Day, supra note 27, at 282. Model acts are
adopted in areas in which there is a "demand for legislation in a substantial number of states,"
but where there is no "pressing need" for uniformity. Id. Uniform acts are recommended for
adoption in alljurisdictions, while model acts are "prepared merely for the convenience of such
legislative bodies as may be interested in them." Id. The result is that uniform acts should,
ideally, be adopted by states with little or no modification. Model acts, on the other hand, serve
only as a blueprint for the states, because uniformity is not deemed important. In addition,
model acts are not considered by state legislatures as quickly as uniform acts. See Comment,
supra note 5, at 172 n.20 (observing that, unlike uniform acts, model acts are often subject to
greater revision by states that adopt them).
The NCCUSL has recommended the following tests to determine whether a subject is
appropriate for uniform legislation:
1. The subject matter should be appropriate for state legislation, in view of the powers
granted to Congress by the Constitution. If the subject matter falls within the
jurisdiction of Congress, "it is not ordinarily an appropriate one for uniform
legislation by the several states."
2. A subject is not appropriate for uniform legislation if it is "primarily of local or state
concern and without substantial interstate implications."
3. If the subject matter is appropriate for state legislation, the Conference must inquire
whether uniform legislation by the several states would promote the economic,
social, and political interests of the people of each of the states that enact the
legislation.
ARMSTRONG, supra note 27, at 67. Legislation should be adopted as a model act if.
1. the legislation "provides, on a matter of interstate interest, a comprehensive well-
worked-out model," provisions of which can be lifted in whole or in part by a state;
or
2. the legislation provides "uniformity of underlying principle on a point of impor-
tance." Such legislation is discouraged, however, in the absence of interstate
implications; or
3. the legislation "provides a model for handling an emergent need to keep emergent
legislation sane and harmonious."
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the statute only as a model act.32
This Article suggests that the Model Employment Termination Act
(Act or Model Act) is really a toothless tiger that, if enacted, will
deprive employees in manyjurisdictions of rights won through judicial
decision, thereby providing them with less protection than they
currently enjoy. Additionally, the Act provides little incentive for
employers to mend their ways and prevent wrongful discharges. The
Article concludes that the Model Act is an ineffective means of
addressing the problem of wrongful discharge.
As an alternative to the Model Act, this Article proposes a compre-
hensive federal statute patterned after title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,"3 as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 19 9 1,m which
would allow recovery of both compensatory and punitive damages by
employees who were wrongfully discharged. 5 The proposed statute,
in combination with tile VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act,36 the Americans With Disabilities Act,37 and similar statutes, 8
would finally provide all employees with comprehensive federal
protection against the wrongful termination of their employment.
Employment and wages are the "stuff of life" for employees: 9 the
rights at issue are far too important to be left to the politics and
regional agendas of fifty different legislatures. Just as Congress has
ARMSTRONG, supra note 27, at 67-68.
32. Randall Sanborn, At-WillDoctrine UnderFre NAT'L L.J. Oct. 14, 1991, at 40. There are
300 commissioners in the NCCUSL, with six appointed from each state. The statute was
defeated as a uniform act by a four-state margin. It was, however, approved as a model act by
a vote of 31-19. Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. IV 1992).
35. See infra notes 438-64 and accompanying text (explaining rationale for amendments to
title VII contained in Civil Rights Act of 1991, and asserting that same rationale also supports
compensatory and punitive damages in wrongful discharge cases).
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988); see infra note 76 (describing Age Discrimination in
Employment Act).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 1992) (prohibiting discrimination in employment
against disabled persons, and requiring "reasonable accommodation" of employee's disability).
38. See, e.g., Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988)
(prohibiting employers from requiring employees to take lie detector tests, and prohibiting
discharge of employees on basis of results of lie detector test or because employee refused to
take lie detector test); Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1988) (prohibiting
termination of employment based on indebtedness or garnishment of wages); Occupational
Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988) (prohibiting discharge of employees who
assert their rights under Act or who refuse to work under inordinately hazardous conditions);
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988) (protecting
employee pension and benefit plans and prohibiting discharge of employee for purpose of
preventing her from attaining vested pension rights).
39. NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 273, 280 (5th Cir. 1962).
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protected the right of employees to bargain collectively4" and to be
free from invidious discrimination, 41 our national legislature must
now protect all employees against the threat of wrongful discharge.
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the historical development of
the employment-at-will doctrine and the erosion of the doctrine that
has occurred in recent years. Part II discusses the rationale for
ending the employment-at-will doctrine and adopting a federal
statute. Part III provides an overview of the Model Employment
Termination Act. Part IV critiques the Model Act. Finally, Part V lays
out the parameters of a federal statute that would protect employees
from various types of discriminatory discharge.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND EROSION OF THE
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
Ironically, English workers in 1349 enjoyed statutory protection
unavailable to American workers today.42  The Statute of
Labourer 41 prohibited both the employer from discharging the
employee and the employee from quitting his employment prior to
the end of the employment term. 4  The statute was later modified
for some classes of workers,' 5 and ultimately it was repealed.46
Nevertheless, the common law of England continued to protect
40. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (1988); see infra notes 237-41 and
accompanying text (discussing National Labor Relations Act).
41. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) (prohibiting employers
from failing to hire, firing, or otherwise discriminating against any individual because of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin"); id. § 2000e-2(c) (making it unlawful for any labor
organization to discriminate against any individual); id. § 2000e-2(d) (providing that on-the-job
training programs may not discriminate on basis of race, color, religion, sex, or nationality); id.
§ 2000e-2(h) (permitting employers to apply different standards of compensation or conditions
of employment pursuant to "bona fide" merit or seniority system, but not because of intention
to discriminate); id. § 2000e-3 (prohibiting employers from discriminating against any employee
who has participated in investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this Act). See generally 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (establishing title VII enforcement provisions and requirements of
equal employment opportunities).
42. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the employment-at-will doctrine, see Clyde
W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation
and Employment at Wll, 52 FoRDHAM L REv. 1082 (1984);Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the
Employment at Will Rul, 20 AM.J. LEGAL HiST. 118 (1976).
43. Statute of Labourers, 23 Edw. III, ch. 1 (1349); 5 Eliz., ch. 4 (1562), cited in David L.
Durkin, Comment, Employment at-Will in the Unionized Setting, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 979, 982 n.16
(1985); see Kurt H. Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania-A Proposal for Its Abolition and
Statutory Regulation, 87 DicK. L. REy. 477, 479 n.12 (1983) (explaining that Statute of Labourers
was legislative response to extreme labor shortage caused by Black Death in 14th century).
44. Durkin, supra note 43, at 982.
45. See generally Durkin, supra note 43, at 982 n.16 (citing Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act (Imp.) 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 86, sched. 17 (1875) as easing Statute of Labourers for
some classes of workers).
46. Decker, supra note 43, at 982.
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workers, viewing the employment relationship as a contractual one. 7
According to Blackstone, hiring was presumed to be for one year.4
This presumption was rebuttable by a showing of contrary intent of
the parties.49  The strong presumption, however, was that the
employment contract was for a definite term."
The English rule presuming employment for a one-year term was
generally applied by American courts throughout the nineteenth
century.5" In 1877, however, Horace G. Wood published his treatise
Master and Servant,2 in which he declared that the "inflexible"
American rule was that a general hiring was "prima fade a hiring at
will.""3 Wood's assertion, which found no support in case law,54 was
47. See Summers, supra note 42, at 1082 (explaining that English common law bound both
employer and employee to presumption of employment for one year, and that "this rule of
presumed duration" was only rebuttable by facts showing contrary intent of parties).
48. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413 ("The contract between [servants] and
their master arises upon the hiring. If the hiring be general without any particular time limited,
the law construes it to be a hiring for a year. .. ."). A later English edition of the treatise
elaborated on the law governing discharge of an employee:
A servant may be dismissed without notice for a reasonable cause, such as moral
misconduct, wilful disobedience to a lawful order, or neglect of duty;, and in such cases
he is not entitled to any wages from the day he is discharged, except those then due.
But if wrongfully discharged, he is entitled to wages up to the end of the current
period of his service. If, on the other hand, a servant who is to be paid quarterly, or
yearly, or at any other fixed time, improperly leaves his service, or is guilty of such
misconduct as tojustify his discharge during the currency of any such period, he is not
entitled to wages for any part thereof, even to the day he quits.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 435 (R. Kerr ed. 1857); see also
Blackburn, supra note 9, at 468 n.1 (commenting on English common-law rules that presumed
that hiring of general servant was for one year, and stating that concept of at-will employment
did not develop from English common law, but rather began in United States).
49. Custom in the trade and frequency of periodic payments were typical facts parties used
to rebut the presumption. See Summers, supra note 42, at 1083 ("The effect was to reduce the
contract of employment from one for a year to one for a lesser period-a quarter or a month.");
See also JOSEPH CHIY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 627 (10th American ed. 1873)
(stating that although law presumes general hiring is for one year, this is not "an inflexible rule
of law," and if there is "a usage in the particular trade, as to the time or manner of putting an
end to a general hiring, such usage will be taken, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
to form part of the contract between the parties").
50. See Summers, supra note 42, at 1083 (although presumption was that employment
contract was for one year, employment-at-will was possible if parties expressly agreed to it); see
also Chitty, supra note 49, at 672 (maintaining that general rule in England was that general
hiring was presumed to be for one year, and that rule was same even if servant were hired under
written contract, provided such contract gave no evidence contrary to this presumption).
51. Summers, supra note 42, at 1083. But see Blackburn, supra note 9, at 468 n.1 (stating
that in mid-19th century, according to some treatise writers, general presumption in American
common law was that employment was for indefinite duration and was terminable at will).
52. HORACE G. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 271 (1877), cited in Summers, supra
note 42, at 1082 n.6.
53. Id. Wood's often-quoted statement of the law provided:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring
at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him
to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time
860
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not immediately adopted by American courts.s" By the beginning of
the twentieth century, however, this erroneous statement of the
common law had become the black-letter law of employment in the
United States.56 This inflexible rule is the common law under which
Americans have labored for most of this century.
Many theories have been suggested as to why the employment-at-will
doctrine was adopted so quickly. The most plausible theory appears
to be that the at-will doctrine reflected the laissez-faire economic
being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a
day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve.
Id.
54. Wood cited no cases to the contrary, though they did exist. See, e.g., Davis v. Gorton,
16 N.Y. 255, 257 (1857) (indefinite hiring of clerks, servants, and those in similar employments
is presumed to be for one year, or from year to year); Bleeker v.Johnson, 51 How. Pr. 380, 381
(N.Y.C.P. 1876) (finding English rule of yearly hiring to be law in United States, and stating that
no U.S. decisions contradicted presumption of hiring for one year). Wood also incorrectly cited
two cases to support his rule. See Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56, 59 (1870)
(observing that contract of hiring by year can only be terminated within year upon notice to
other party if condition could be inferred from trade usage or prior negotiations); Franklin
Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115, 116 (1871) (holding that indefinite duration by itself did
not give employer complete discretion to discharge employee). For a general discussion of
these cases, see Summers, supra note 42, at 1083, andJ. Peter Shapiro &James F. Tune, Note,
Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 341-42 n.54 (1974).
55. American Courts were initially inconsistent in their adoption of Wood's rule. See
Summers, supra note 42, at 1084 n.10 (citing cases where American courts followed English rule
of presumed hiring for one year); see also id. at 1084 n.II (citing American case law adopting
Wood's rule of at-will employment). For example, the New York Court of Appeals initially
followed the English rule, Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 26 N.E. 143 (N.Y. 1891), but then four years
later adopted Wood's position, dismissing its own language in the earlier case as dictum, Martin
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1895). Williston, in the 1893 edition of Parsons on
Contracts, accepted the English rule without comment. See 2 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTrS 33-34 (S. Williston ed., 8th ed. 1893) (stating that employer can end hiring only
after one year, unless there existed some express or implied agreement from contract, custom,
or trade usage to contrary). Subsequent editors, including Williston, stated that the English rule
required a month's notice, but added, "We are not aware that a similar rule exists in this
country." PARSONS, supra, at 32-34. In a later publication, even Wood observed no difference
between the English and American rules. See Horace G. Wood, Preface to the Second American
Edition of C.G. ADDISON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS iii (8th ed. 1888) ("There is
but little difference in the law relating to contracts as administered in the courts of England and
this country."); see also Summers, supra note 42, 1084 n.9 (noting that Wood's 1888 appendix
to Addison on Contracts failed to mention difference between English and American rules, and
that table of cases did not list any of cases originally used to support Wood's proposition). For
Wood's appendix to Addison on Contracts, see 3 ADDISON, supra, app. On the other hand, in his
second edition of Master and Servant published in 1886, Wood made no change to his text.
Summers, supra note 42, at 1084 n.9 (citing H.G. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 136, at 283 (2d
ed. 1886).
56. See Feinman, supra note 42, at 126; see also Durkin, supra note 43, at 984 (stating that
majority of American courts adopted Wood's rule by turn of 20th century). But see Andrew P.
Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical & Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will,
59 Mo. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994) (suggesting that Wood did not misstate the law, because
presumption of at-will employment had been adopted by seven states before Wood published
his treatise in 1877, and it appeared in first draft of proposed New York Civil Code drafted by
David Dudley Field in 1862).
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attitude of the time. 7 The nation was young and in the throes of
the Industrial Revolution; freedom to contract and freedom to engage
in entrepreneurial activity were watchwords for the country 8 This
was a time of expanding business, when theJohn D. Rockefellers and
Andrew Carnegies helped the nation's economy grow and take its
place in the community of nations, but often did so at the expense of
the health, welfare, and well-being of employees. It was in this
industrial and commercial environment, for example, that children
labored long hours under dangerous conditions for minimal
compensation. 9 Attempts by employees to unionize and improve
their lot often met with stiff, even violent, resistance from employers,
as well as criminal prosecution.' The idea of employees possessing
rights was anathema to employers of the period. This was, of course,
"The Jungle" memorialized so vividly by Upton Sinclair.6
A. Statutory Exceptions to the At-Will Doctrine
During the course of the twentieth century, federal and state
legislation modified or abrogated the employment-at-will doctrine.
The first federal legislation, the Clayton Act,6" which was adopted in
57. See Frank J. Cavico, Employment at Will and Public Policy, 25 AKRON L. REv. 497, 500-01
(1992) (suggesting that American courts adopted Wood's rule of employment at will to reflect
expectations and beliefs of existing dominant business class and to promote industrial expansion
and growth of capitalist employers by advancing employers' right to control business and labor
force); MatthewW. Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work: Employer Policies and Contract Law, 1986
Wis. L. REv. 733, 733 (noting that employment-at-will doctrine arose in America as result of
laissez-faire philosophy and 19th century formalism). Finkin also suggests that courts assumed
a relationship of "impermanence and instability" between employer and employee in light of
high employee turnover rate in mid-20th century. Finkin, supra, at 737-39; see also Ludwick v.
This Minute Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213, 214 (S.C. 1985) ("[T]he doctrine, if not expressly created to
subserve the laissez-faire climate of the late 19th century, has had the effect of doing so."). But
see Morriss, supra note 56 (arguing that adoption of employment-at-will rule was not reflection
of laissez-faire attitude of period, but rather was "a response of the courts as institutions to the
problems of nineteenth century employment law cases," which gave courts a "simple, clear
rule").
58. See Cavico, supra note 57, at 500 (discussing rise of"capitalist employer" as United States
evolved into industrial nation during late 19th century).
59. See generally THE ADDRESSES AT THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR
COMMITEE (Feb. 14-16, 1905), reprinted in 25 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 417-56 (Emory RJohnson ed., 1905) [hereinafter CHILD LABOR]
(addressing evils of child labor in United States in early 20th century, such as physical disease,
negative effects on moral and mental development of children, and low wage rates).
60. ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT IN LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLEGTIVE
BARGAINING 1 (1976) (explaining that concerted employee activities for better wages and
working conditions were treated as common-law conspiracies in early 19th century and were
viewed as illegal because of means used or ends sought by these groups).
61. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906) (depicting life and labor experiences of Slavic
immigrant working in horrid conditions of Chicago meat-packing industry in early 20th century).
62. Pub. L. No. 212, 38 Star. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-44
(1988)).
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1914, was designed to protect unions from employers' use of federal
antitrust law to prevent the unions from organizing. 6 A few years
later, Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act!' to protect the right
of railway workers to organize and bargain collectively.65  Congress
next adopted the National Labor Relations Act,' which began the
development of the modern law of collective bargaining and labor-
management relations. 7 Later, the Fair Labor Standards Act&
secured minimum wages69 and guaranteed overtime pay ° and other
employee benefits.7 In the meantime, the states began to develop
parallel labor relations legislation72 and related social welfare
63. See 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1988) (prohibiting injunctions from being granted in dispute
between employers and employees regarding conditions of employment); 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988)
(stating that provisions of Clayton Act shall not prohibit formation of labor organizations). After
the Supreme Court interpreted the Clayton Act narrowly in Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 469-72 (1921), Congress responded with the Norris-La Guardia Act in
1932, which severely restricted the right of federal courts to issue injunctions in any labor
dispute. Pub. L. No. 198, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1988)). The Norris-La Guardia Act prohibits injunctions from being issued in any labor dispute
unless the court finds: (1) that "unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed
unless restrained or have been committed" and will continue; (2) that "substantial and
irreparable injury" will come to the property of the party seeking the injunction; (3) that if the
injunction is denied, greater harm will come to the complainant than that which "will be
inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief"; (4) that the party bringing the action has
no other remedy available at law, and (5) that those who are obligated to "protect the
complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection." 29 U.S.C. § 107
(1988).
64. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 576 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988)).
65. See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (granting employees right to collective bargaining "through
representatives of their own choosing"); see also id. § 181 (extending protection of Railway Labor
Act to workers on every common air carrier).
66. Pub. L No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1988)) (NLRA). Congress made significant amendments to the NLRA in 1947 in the Labor
Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1988)), and in 1959 in the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.
Pub. L No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 541 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 160 (1988)).
See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of NLRA).
67. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (granting employees right to collectively bargain); see also id. § 158
(defining prohibited activities deemed to be unfair labor practices under Act).
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
69. See id. § 206 (establishing minimum wage rates).
70. See id. § 207(a) (providing that any employer who requires employee to work more than
40 hours per week must pay such employee overtime compensation "at a rate not less than one
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed").
71. See, e.g., id. § 206(d) (prohibiting employers from paying female employees lower wages
than those paid to male workers performing same work); id. § 207 (prescribing maximum weekly
working hours for employees); id § 207(o) (allowing employees of public agencies to receive
compensatory time in lieu of overtime compensation); id. § 212 (prohibiting child labor); id.
§ 217 (allowing injunctions to be granted against employers who violate provisions of Fair Labor
Standards Act).
72. See, e.g., Labor Peace Act, CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 8-3-101,123 (1986 & Supp. 1993); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 150B, §§ 1-8 (Law. Co-op. 1989); NewYork State Labor Relations Act, N.Y. LABOR
LAW §§ 700-717 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994); see also Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection
Against Unjust DismissaL Timefor a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 492 (1976) (listing 15 states that
have passed statutes similar to National Labor Relations Act).
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legislation such as child labor laws. 3
In 1963, Congress adopted the first federal statute to protect
workers from discrimination.74  One year later, the legislators
enacted the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited
employers from discriminating against employees based on race, sex,
religion, color, or national origin.75 Subsequent federal legislation
protected employees from discrimination based upon age76 or
handicap. 77 State legislatures have also adopted statutes that parallel
much of the federal legislation.71 Indeed, many of the federal
statutes provide for enforcement by states with similar statutes.79
73. See Barbara Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?":• Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property,
33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1060 (1992) (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT,
JR., THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, IX HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED
STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910-1921, at 447 (Paul A. Freund &
Stanley N. Katz eds., 1984)) (observing that states responded to changing societal attitudes that
condemned child labor by enacting "various child labor laws").
74. Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1988)) (requiring that covered employers pay men and women equally for work requiring equal
skill, effort, and responsibility).
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988); see supra note 41 (discussing provisions of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and various unlawful employer practices).
76. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988) (prohibiting
discrimination in employment against persons who are 40 years old or older). The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
Id. § 623(a); see also id. § 633(a) (extending freedom from age discrimination to all those who
are employed by Federal Government and 40 years of age or older).
77. See, e.g., Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV
1992) (prohibiting discrimination in employment because of physical disability or mental
impairment); Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796(i) (1988) (requiring most federal
contractors to engage in affirmative action to hire handicapped persons, and prohibiting
discrimination against handicapped persons in employment by any program or activity receiving
federal funding); id. § 701 (stating that purpose of Act is to guarantee equal opportunity for
handicapped persons and to create and implement "comprehensive and coordinated programs
of vocational rehabilitation and independent living" for handicapped individuals to facilitate and
maximize integration into workforce); see also 29 U.S.C. 791 (b)-(c) (requiring affirmative action
program plans for hiring and advancement of handicapped individuals in federal agencies and
encouraging same in state agencies).
78. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-963 (1991)
(establishing right to freedom from discrimination in employment, housing, and public
accommodations); NewYork Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1993)
(creating employees' right to equal opportunity to obtain employment without discrimination
because of age, race, creed, sex, national origin, color, or marital status).
79. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1988) (requiring that persons alleging unlawful
employment practices that violate title VII, but which also violate state or local law, first must
commence proceedings under state or local law before filing charge with Equal Employment
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In addition to the various legislation addressing collective bargain-
ing, discrimination, wages, and myriad other matters, both state and
federal governments have developed statutory and regulatory
protection for government employees under civil service statutes."0
These statutes generally protect an employee from wrongful discharge
and guarantee him or her due process in any dismissal proceeding.8 '
B. Common-Law Exceptions to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine
Despite the progress made on the legislative front, courts steadfastly
adhered to the employment-at-will doctrine throughout most of this
century.8" During the last decade or more, however, state courts
have begun to modify the common law and recognize various causes
of action for employees who have been wrongfully terminated.83
1. Tort theories
The oldest and most widely recognized judicially created exception
to the employment-at-will rule is the tort of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy,84 which was first recognized in a California
case in which an employee was discharged for refusing to perjure
himself at the direction of his employer. Underlying this exception
Opportunity Commission under title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (1988) (providing that no
provision of Fair Labor Standards Act shall justify noncompliance with state law or municipal
ordinance establishing standard higher than federal standard); id. § 633(b) (prohibiting
commencement of any federal age discrimination action based on an alleged unlawful
employment practice that occurred in state that prohibits age discrimination in employment,
unless claimant has first commenced proceedings under state law).
80. See HENRY H. PERmrr, JR., 2 EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRAcICE § 6.3, at 6 (3d ed.
1992).
81. See id. Public employees also enjoy some constitutional protection of their jobs. See
infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have recognized public
employee's constitutionally protected property and due process rights in employment).
82. See Martin H. Malin, The Distributive and Corrective Justice Concerns in the Debate Over
EmploymentAt-WL" Some Preliminayy Thoughts, 68 CH.-KENT L. REV. 117, 117 (1992) (discussing
ways in which courts have begun to attack employment-at-will doctrine in recent years); Todd
M. Smith, Comment, Wrongful Discharge Reexamined: The Ciisis Matures, Ohio Responds, 41 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1209, 1218 (1991) (noting that not until 1980s has employment-at-will doctrine
been appreciably modified by courts).
83. Today, only three states have no clearly defined exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine: Florida, Louisiana, and Rhode Island. See Individual Employee Rights Man. (BNA)
505:51-52 (1994).
84. See Smith, supra note 82, at 1218.
85. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959). In Petertnann, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant union as a business agent and
was subpoenaed to testify before a California Legislative Committee. Id. at 26. The plaintiff
alleged that he was discharged because he refused to perjure himself before the committee. Id.
The court observed that where the term of employment is not fixed, the relationship between
employer and employee is terminable at the will of either party for any reason whatsoever. The
court concluded, however, that the right to discharge an employee may be limited by
consideration of public policy. Id. Furthermore, in order to more fully effectuate the state's
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is the premise that important public policies would be frustrated and
their violation condoned if employers could discharge employees with
impunity for reasons that violate those policies.8" The development
of the tort has followed a pattern: the courts identify employee
conduct that they conclude is worthy of protection for "reasons of
social utility," and then protect employees from dismissal for the
exercise of such conduct.17  A plaintiff may often recover both
compensatory and punitive damages when his or her discharge
violates public policy.88
Courts have looked to statutes, constitutions, administrative
regulations, and professional codes of ethics to identify the relevant
public policy.89 In defining such public policies, courts have typically
required that the policy be "clear[ly] mandate[d]," "well-accept-
ed,"'91 or grounded in some statutory or constitutional provision. 2
Courts do not, however, always "strictly limit employee protection to
their exercise of statutory rights or compliance with statutory
duties."93 Many courts have expanded the doctrine beyond instances
declared policy against perjury, civil law will deny the employer an unlimited right to discharge
an employee whose employment is for an unspecified duration when the reason for the dismissal
is the employee's refusal to commit perjury. Id. at 27-28.
Forty-three states now recognize the public policy exception. 9A Individual Employee Rights
Man. (BNA) 505:51-52 (1994). Only Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi,
and New York have either rejected the principle or not yet considered the issue. Id.
86. See St. Antoine, supra note 5, at 274 (noting that failure of courts to recognize cause of
action in situations where employee is discharged for refusing to engage in illegal activity or for
performing public duty would effectively condone grave violation of public policy); Smith, supra
note 82, at 1218 (observing that courts that have recognized public policy exception to
employment-at-will doctrine have rested their decisions on rationale that legislative goals and
general social policies would be defeated if employees could be discharged for certain "bad
reasons").
87. Malin, supra note 82, at 127.
88. Smith, supra note 82, at 1219 (stating that courts have awarded punitive damages when
they find it "imperative to deter future employer conduct that might frustrate important social
policies").
89. Smith, supra note 82, at 1218.
90. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 509 (NJ. 1980) (recognizing that
action in tort for wrongful discharge might exist if there was violation of "clear mandate of
public policy") (citing Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974)).
91. Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 353 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Mich. 1984) (Williams, CJ.,
dissenting) (requiring that each public policy exception be grounded on "clearly articulated,
well-accepted public policy").
92. See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983) (holding that
public policy must be "evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision"); St. Antoine, supra
note 5, at 275 (noting that many courts have hesitated to articulate public policy in this area,
and even those that have been more willing to embrace public policy have required that it be
evidenced by constitutional or statutory provision); Smith, supra note 82, at 1218 (explaining
that courts have generally recognized only those public policies that derive from statutory or
constitutionally warranted right).
93. Malin, supra note 82, at 127 (describing how manyjurisdictions require statutory basis
for public policy but do not rigorously confine employee protections to employees who exert
866
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where an employee is discharged for simply refusing to engage in
unlawful activity. Today, an employee discharged for performing a
public duty, such as serving on ajury, 94 reporting employer wrongdo-
ing (commonly known as "whistleblowing"),95 or exercising some
legally protected right or privilege, such as filing a workers' compensa-
tion claim, may be able to assert a claim. 6
Unfortunately, courts have been wildly inconsistent in determining
what employee conduct should be protected. For example, in Illinois,
an employee who protests violations of state and federal safety statutes
by his or her employer is protected, while one who protests an
employer's violations of a municipal safety ordinance is not.
97
Similarly, Illinois law protects an employee who is fired for filing a
workers' compensation claim, but not an employee who is fired for
filing a health insurance claim under the employer's group plan.98
their statutory rights or follow statutory duties).
94. See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975) (holding that employer who discharged
employee because she served on jury was liable to employee for any damage she suffered as
result of discharge because of community's interest in jury system and having citizens serve on
jury).
95. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385,389 (Conn. 1980) (holding
that quality control director who was hired at will and who alleged that he had been dismissed
in retaliation for insistence that employer comply with requirements of Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act sufficiently alleged cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge of employment
in light of expression of public policy that statute represents); Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 879-80 (Ill. 1981) (holding that employee who alleged employer
discharged him for informing local law enforcement officials that co-worker might be violating
criminal code and agreeing to cooperate with authorities, stated cause of action for retaliatory
discharge because employer's actions clearly contravened public policy). Today many states have
enacted "whistleblower" statutes to protect employees from wrongful discharge for reporting
violations of public policy. See supra note 26 (citing Ohio and Michigan whistieblower statutes).
96. See, e.g., Kelsayv. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 358 (Ill. 1978) (holding that employee
stated cause of action in tort against employer who allegedly wrongfully discharged employee
for filing injury claims under Workmen's Compensation Act); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co.,
297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973) (holding that retaliatory discharge for filing workmen's
compensation claim is "a wrongful, unconscionable act that should be actionable in a court of
law").
97. Compare Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372, 377 (Ill. 1985) (holding
that employee's allegation that he was discharged in retaliation for his refusal to handle
radioactive material in operation thatviolated Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations stated
cause of action because unsafe conditions under which he was required to work contravened
clearly mandated public policy of protecting lives and property of citizens from hazards of
radioactive material), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1122 (1986) with Gould v. Campbell's Ambulance
Serv. Inc., 488 N.E.2d 993, 994-95 (Il1. 1986) (holding that emergency medical technicians who
were discharged after allegedly voicing objections that another technician was not certified as
required by city ordinance, did not have cause of action for retaliatory discharge because
statutory provision and ordinance failed to show existence of clearly mandated public policy).
See also Malin, supra note 82, at 128 ("[Aid hoc evaluation of the social utility of employee
conduct has produced results that to a reasonable employer or employee must appear to be
incomprehensible anomalies.").
98. Compare Kelsay, 384 N.E.2d at 358 (holding that employee had cause of action against
employer for alleged wrongful discharge for filing claim for injury under Workmen's
Compensation Act) ith Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 359, 361 (111. 1985) (holding
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In Pennsylvania, the law protects an employee who investigates illegal
self-dealing by the president of his employer, but if the employee
seeks to have an unsafe product removed from the marketplace, the
employee is left unprotected from discharge.99
Unquestionably, the tort of wrongful discharge provides a valuable
remedy in some of the most outrageous employment termination
cases. Only a handful of employees, however, can avail themselves of
this remedy. Generally, only upper- and middle-management
employees are in a position to sue under a public-policy theory of
wrongful termination. Lower level workers are rarely able to succeed
under this theory."° Consequently, plaintiff's lawyers have sought
to expand the theories of recovery in tort. Other tort theories used
successfully in employment termination litigation include intentional
interference with contractual relations, l01 intentional infliction of
emotional distress,"0 2  fraud and misrepresentation,"3  defama-
tion,14 negligence, 105 and invasion of privacy. 06
that alleged discharge of employee for filing health insurance claim under employer's group
policy could not support cause of action for retaliatory discharge because it did not violate
clearly mandated public policy). See generally Malin, supra note 82, at 128 (discussing Kelsay and
Price).
99. Compare Klages v. Sperry Corp., 118 L.R.tRM. (BNA) 2463, 2468-69 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
(holding that corporate general counsel who allegedly was terminated in retaliation for having
investigated self-dealing by president of company in order to establish potential violations of
federal securities laws stated claim for wrongful discharge based on public policy exception to
employment-at-will doctrine) with Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa.
1974) (employee who was allegedly discharged in retaliation for having alerted his superiors to
unsafe nature of products had no right of action against employer for wrongful discharge where
no clear mandate of public policy was violated). See generally Malin supra note 82, at 128
(discussing KIages and Ceary).
100. William B. Gould IV, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbitration, 13
EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 404, 413-14 (1987) (stating that public policy theory has little relevance for
average employee because most average employees are not in position to engage in
whistleblowing or other types of conduct protected by public policy theory). Professor Lawrence
Blades persuasively argued some years ago for adoption of the tort of "abusive discharge," which
would reach beyond the limits of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Blades, supra
note 10, at 1435 (concluding that courts could create tort remedy for abusively discharged
employees that would eliminate potential for oppression inherent in employment relationship);
see also Daniel A. Mathews, Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employe 26
HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1464 (1975) (suggesting that cause of action for wrongful discharge be
grounded in tort). Although a few courts seem to have implicitly embraced the idea, Professor
Blade's proposal has never been given an expansive reception.
101. HENRY H. PERRrrr,JR., 1 EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACrICE § 5.41, at 537-43 (3d
ed. 1992).
102. Id. § 5.42, at 543-48.
103. Id. § 5.43, at 548-53.
104. Id. § 5.44, at 553-59.
105. Id. § 5.48, at 571-75.
106. Id. § 5.45, at 559-62.
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2. Contract theories
Under contract theory, opportunities to recover damages, particu-
larly for rank-and-file employees, are limited."7 If the employee
bases the claim solely in contract, she can only recover damages based
on her compensation; the employee cannot recover damages for the
pain, anguish, and frustration suffered as a result of the job loss.08
Moreover, contract-based damage awards may be insufficient to
compensate the employee's lawyer."
Nevertheless, the contract theory is the one asserted most often by
discharged employees."' At least thirty-four states now recognize
claims rooted in theories of contract.' Such claims are usually
based on an employer handbook, employment policy, or some other
document that creates the terms of a binding contract.112  For
example, in one of the earliest cases to recognize this theory, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that a personnel manual stating that
it was company policy to discharge only for just cause created a
contractual term binding the employer."3  In other cases, courts
have found contractual protection for employees because of promises
made at the time of employment. 4  Even a history of good perfor-
mance reviews and promotions, coupled with promises of continued
employment, has led courts to grant contract protection for employ-
ees. 1
15
107. See Gould, supra note 100, at 413 (stating that because employee's potential recovery
will be based in part on employee's income, damage recoveries will be limited).
108. Gould, supra note 100, at 413.
109. See Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB.
L. REV. 7, 25 (1988) ("[Clontract damages will not support a lawsuit.").
110. See generally Smith, supra note 82, at 1215-18 (describing implied contract theory that
limits scope of employer's power to terminate employment relationship).
111. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, NewJersey, New Mexico, NewYork, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming recognize a cause of action based in contract. 9A Individual Employee Rights Man.
(BNA) 505:51-52 (1994).
112. See Smith, supra note 82, at 1215 ("[Clourts have recognized that employer handbooks,
policies, or other representations to the employees may form an implied contract limiting the
employer's right to terminate his employees.").
113. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 1980).
114. See e.g., American Bank Stationeryv. Farmer, 799 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Nev. 1990) (holding
that employer's statement that if employee did his job adequately he would keep hisjob because
"that's the way [we] operate," constituted offer that included explicit promise by company to
keep employee so long as he performed adequately); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d
441, 495 (N.Y. 1982) (finding oral representation that employer discharged employees only for
just cause was specific promise of employment security and was sufficient evidence of contract).
115. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 887-88 (Cal. 1988) (explaining that
steady series of salary increases, promotions, bonuses, awards, and superior performance
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Some courts have also allowed recovery under a theory of promisso-
ry estoppel.1 6 Although all the necessary indicia of a contract may
not be present, the courts have found in such cases that the employer
made promises upon which the employee relied to his detriment. For
example, if an employee were induced to move from one state to
another to take a job with a new employer, and the employer
suddenly discharged the employee without just cause, the employee
could assert a claim in several states based on a promissory estoppel
theory.
1 7
3. Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
Another contractual remedy available to wrongfully discharged
employees is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
though only a handful of states currently recognize this claim.
8
The doctrine originated in insurance contracts, but is now commonly
implied in all contracts." 9 From an employee's point of view, the
good faith and fair dealing claim is attractive because the employee
may receive compensatory and punitive damages for wrongful
discharge. 2 ' Moreover, in contrast to the claim of wrongful dis-
evaluations over six years and nine months of employment gave rise to implied-in-fact contract
limiting right of employer to discharge employee arbitrarily).
116. See, e.g., Rodie v. Max Factor & Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3-5 (Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that discharged employee, who gave up secure employment in one locale to transfer to new
venture only after receiving assurances ofjob security from employer, had enough evidence to
support oral modification of prior written contract that allowed employee to be fired for any
cause); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150, 154-55 (Ohio 1985) (holding that
plaintiff, who was suspended from his job until criminal charges against him were "favorably
resolved," but who was discharged when trial ended in hung jury and all charges subsequently
were dismissed, could assert claim of promissory estoppel). See generaly 1 LEX K. LARSON,
UNJUST DISMISSAL § 3.04(1] (1992) (discussing promissory estoppel doctrine and how courts
have often departed from traditional contours of at-will rule in enforcing implied-in-fact contract
obligations arising from employer representations).
117. See, e.g., Unker v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(holding that former employee's claim that he had moved family to more expensive home in
reliance on former employer's oral promise not to terminate him except for just cause was
sufficient consideration to make promise enforceable); Sheppard v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 266
Cal. Rptr. 784, 787 (Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (ruling that employer was promissorily estopped from
asserting at-will employment relationship as basis for terminating new employee before he began
actively working and after he had accepted employment and moved across country).
118. Thirteen states now recognize the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, and New Hampshire. Ind. Emp. Rights Manual (BNA) 505:51-
52 (1992).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); see also Fortune v. National Cash
Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977) (holding that parties to contracts must act in
good faith toward and deal fairly with one another). But see English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521,
522 (Tex. 1983) (refusing to impose obligation of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts).
120. See Smith, supra note 82, at 1219 (noting that implied covenant exception increases
employee's chances of receiving punitive damages if employee is wrongfully discharged).
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charge in violation of public policy, which is available to only a small
number of employees, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
when recognized, is an implied term of employment for all employ-
ees.
121
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was the first court to
recognize the covenant exception to the traditional employment-at-
will doctrine in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.122 In Monge, an employee
was discharged for refusing to date her foreman.123  The court
concluded that "a termination by the employer of a contract of
employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based
on retaliation is not [sic] the best interest of the economic system or
the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment
contract."' 24  The logic of the decision is compelling: there is no
inherent difference between an implied or express employment
contract and any other contract. 125  Despite the appeal of inferring
the existence of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every
employment contract, however, only a handful of courts have
embraced the doctrine.
26
Although the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is based in contract law, some courts have
allowed recovery of tort damages. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,
729 (Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that breach of implied covenant provides for punitive
damages), cited in Smith, supra, at 1221; Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213, 216
(Mont. 1983) (stating that punitive damages would be available for breach of implied covenant),
cited in Smith, supra, at 1224. In a departure from the traditional approach of allowing tort
damages for breach of covenant, however, the California Supreme Court held in a four-to-three
decision that a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing gives rise to recovery in
contract only. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 401 (Cal. 1988), cited in Smith,
supra, at 1222.
121. Smith, supra note 82, at 1219.
122. 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974).
123. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974).
124. Id. The court further noted: "The employer has long ruled the workplace with an iron
hand .... The law governing the relations between employer and employee has ... evolved
to reflect changing legal, social and economic conditions." Id. at 551 (citations omitted). The
court in Monge concluded that its new rule "affords the employee a certain stability of
employment and does not interfere with the employer's normal exercise of his right to
discharge, which is necessary to permit him to operate his business efficiently and profitably."
Id. at 552.
125. See Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977).
Commenting on the decision in Mange, the court in Fortune observed:
[TJhe holding in the Mongecase merely extends to employment contracts the rule that
"in every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything
which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract there exists an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."
Id. (citations omitted).
126. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting that only 13 states now recognize
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
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II. THE NEED FOR STATUTORY PROTECTION FOR WRONGFULLY
DISCHARGED EMPLOYEES
A. Changing Expectations
The employment-at-will doctrine is a lumbering dinosaur that can
no longer be rationally defended.127 The time has come to bury it.
Justice Kilgarlin of the Texas Supreme Court has eloquently
described the anachronistic nature of the doctrine, observing,
"Absolute employment at will is a relic of early industrial times,
conjuring up visions of the sweat shops described by Charles Dickens
and his contemporaries. The doctrine belongs in a museum, not in
our law."128 Perhaps at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, when
employers were small, relationships were personal, and employment
was reasonably plentiful,1 29 the rule had some utility. But in today's
complex society of national and global corporations, where the
average employee has little or no bargaining power and the corpora-
tion has lost its conscience in the belly of a large, bureaucratic
structure, there is no reason to continue to deny employees statutory
protection against abusive discharge.' The nature of employment
has changed radically since the nineteenth century, from a time when
long-term relationships between employers and employees were rare,
to a time in which long-term relationships are expected and encour-
aged."'1 During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, high
employee turnover was the norm, and employers made no effort to
encourage employees to stay.112 Americans were "alive to any new
127. Sabine Pilot Serv. Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (Kilgarlin, J.,
concurring).
128. Id. Justice Kilgarlin also observed that because the doctrine was judicially promulgated,
the court had "the burden and the duty of amending it to reflect social and economic changes."
Id.
129. Blades, supra note 10, at 1416.
130. Blades, supra note 10, at 1416. Professor Blades states:
Such a philosophy of the employer's dominion over his employee may have fit the
rustic simplicity of the days when the farmer or small entrepreneur, who may or may
not have employed others, was the epitome of American individualism. But the
philosophy is incompatible with these days of large, impersonal, corporate employers;
it does not comport with the need to preserve individual freedom in today's job-
oriented industrial society.
Id.; see also Cavico, supra note 57, at 536 (advocating "broad, all-embracing, minimal, protective
coverage for all non-probationary employees of employers over a certain size").
131. SeeFinkin, supra note 57, at 737-43 (discussing evolution from employment relationship
existing in early 20th century, which was characterized by extreme employee turnover because
of lack of incentives for long-term employment, to relationship that exists today that does
encourage and reward long-term employee service).
132. See Finkin, supra note 57, at 737-38 (describing massive employee turnover in early 20th
century). For example, in the early 1800s, the mean aggregate turnover rate for employees in
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contingency which promise [d] to better their condition.", 33 In light
of the peripatetic nature of the nineteenth and early twentieth
century worker, it is no surprise that courts viewed employment as a
short-term, "at-will" arrangement.
34
Feeble efforts by employers to reduce turnover began in the early
part of the twentieth century.15 It was not until after World War II,
however, that the modern long-term employment relationship began
to evolve. 136  For example, in 1929, only two percent of industrial
firms had pension plans, while in 1957, seventy-three percent of large
firms had them.137 In 1929, only thirty-four percent of large firms
had personnel departments, but in 1963, eighty-one percent had such
departmentsNI Factors influencing this trend toward encouraging
employee longevity included "[t ] he labor legislation instituted by the
some Massachusetts textile mills was 163%. Id. at 737. The railroad companies of the mid-19th
century retained less than half their employees for more than six months. Id. In the early years
of the 20th century, turnover continued to be mind-boggling by today's standards. Id. at 738.
The majority of industrial workers changed jobs at least every three years. Id. At the Armour
meat packing plant in Chicago, for example, the average daily payroll numbered 8000 in 1914.
Id. In order to keep the workforce at that level, however, Armour had to hire 8000 workers
during the course of the year, continuously replacing the transient workers. Id. at 738. Daniel
Rodgers provides a detailed description of the problem:
Large surveys of textile mills, automobile plants, steel mills, clothing shops, and
machine works showed turnover rates at least as high as... 100 percent .... In the
woolen industry between 1907 and 1910, turnover varied between 113 and 163 percent
.... It reached 232 percent among NewYork City cloak, suit, and skirt shops in 1912-
13, 252 percent in a sample of Detroit factories in 1916, and the bewildering rate of
370 percent at Ford in 1913. The most extensive study, undertaken by the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistics and using data from 1913-14, found a "normal"
turnover rate in the factories of 115 percent, and, given the depressed economic
conditions in those years, that figure, if it erred at all, underestimated the normal
amount ofjob changing.
DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1850-1920, at 163 (1978); see
Finkin, supra note 57, at 738.
133. Finkin, supra note 57, at 737 (citing THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF MANUFACTURERS 250
(Nathan Rosenberg ed. 1969) (quoting George Wallis in his report to House of Commons
regarding visit to New York Industrial Exhibition in 1854)).
134. See Finkin, supra note 57, at 738-39 (noting that because of migratory tendencies of
employees in early 20th century, courts assumed relationship of "impermanence and
instability").
135. See Finkin, supra note 57, at 740-43 (discussing various methods used by employers to
reduce turnover, including employing personnel departments and other types of employee
welfare plans).
136. See Finkin, supra note 57, at 740-43 (noting how modern long-term relationship
following World War II was shaped by "New Deal, the centralization and professionalization of
personnel work, the impact of unionization, and the goods of personnel professionals"). The
attitude of the pre-World War II era is demonstrated by the story of a foreman who reported
to his superior that no one had been fired in the plant that day, at which point the superior
ordered the foreman to "'fire a couple of 'em' .... It'll put the fear of God in their hearts.'"
Id. at 740 (quoting SANFORD M.JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900-1945, at 21 (1985)) (citations omitted).
137. Finkin, supra note 57, at 742 (citingJACOBY, supra note 136, at 233).
138. Finkin, supra note 57, at 742 (citingJACOBY, supra note 136, at 233).
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New Deal, the centralization and professionalization of personnel
work, the impact of unionization, and the goals of personnel
professionals." '139 It was not until well into the twentieth century,
therefore, that the modem concept of long-term employment became
the norm.
140
In the modem age, employers and employees enter into the
employment relationship with significantly different expectations than
did their predecessors. 141 Unlike their predecessors, today's employ-
ees generally expect their employment to be long-term. Although
employees may begin their careers in short-termjobs, most eventually
settle into a long-term career with the same employer. 4 This
139. Finkin, supra note 57, at 741. According to Professor Finkin, the workplace has now
become "bureaucratized." The clearest evidence of this bureaucratiz.tion is the explosion of
employment manuals. As late as 1935, only 13% of industrial firms had such rulebooks. Id. at
743. By 1940, the number had risen to 30%. Id. A 1979 study, in contrast, showed 75% of the
responding companies had employee handbooks. Id.
140. See Finkin, supra note 57, at 740-43 (discussing how employment relationship evolved
to where employers began to encourage and reward long-term employee service).
141. See Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV.
631, 674 (1988) (noting that presumption of employment-at-will no longer accurately reflects
expectations of most employees and that employers do not presume that termination decisions
should routinely be made without reference to job qualifications and performance or, in case
ofjob elimination, valid economic factors).
142. See generally Malin, supra note 82, at 136-37 (noting that most employees assume that
employment will continue as long as performance is satisfactory).
143. Malin, supra note 82, at 136. "The typical worker spends eight years on ajob; more
than twenty-five percent of the workforce stays with the same job for twenty years or more and
the probability of turnover decreases asjob tenure increases." O'Connor, supra note 10, at 1204.
Job changes "occur at a young age; if a worker has been at a job for a number of years, the
chances are that employment will continue for a long time." Id. at 1204 n.89 (citing Hall, The
Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 716, 720 (1982)). In fact, 40%
of workers who work at ajob for at least five years will remain there for more than 20 years. Id.
(citing Addison & Castro, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs: Differences Between Union and Nonunion
Workers, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 393, 402 (1987)).
Professor Marlene O'Connor explains this long-term attachment between employee and
employer in terms of "the implied contract theory." Id. at 1204. Implicit contracts are not legal
contracts, but rather "social arrangements typically enforced through the operation of market
forces." Id. at 1204-05. According to the implicit contract theory, "wages are not set in the
external labor market. Instead large firms internalize their employment structures." Id. at 1205.
The result is that workers are underpaid at the beginning of their tenure with their employer
and overpaid at the end. Id. As employees continue to work for their employer, they grow
increasingly dependent upon the employer and become "economically wedded" to it. Id.
Another reason employees remain in long-term employment is that they are "risk-averse." Id.
If their employer experiences a temporary fluctuation in the demand for an employee's labor,
the employee faces serious economic consequences from unemployment. As employees become
older, their "employment opportunities tend to decrease." Id. Because they only have one job,
employees cannot diversify their risk, but must make "risky investments of their time" in their
employer. In contrast, large employers are able to provide "implicit insurance contracts" to
employees to protect them from wage fluctuations. Id. Under this arrangement, younger
workers are paid at wages lower than the marginal product they produce. By paying the lower
wages in the early years of an employee's career, the employer is able to indemnify the employee
by "continuing to pay a steady wage" when the employee is older and less productive. Id. at
1205-06. Theoretically, these "insurance premiums" protect employees when external market
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contingency which promise [d] to better their condition."1 3 In light
of the peripatetic nature of the nineteenth and early twentieth
century worker, it is no surprise that courts viewed employment as a
short-term, "at-will" arrangement.
1 34
Feeble efforts by employers to reduce turnover began in the early
part of the twentieth century.3 5 It was not until after World War II,
however, that the modern long-term employment relationship began
to evolve.136  For example, in 1929, only two percent of industrial
firms had pension plans, while in 1957, seventy-three percent of large
firms had them.3 7 In 1929, only thirty-four percent of large firms
had personnel departments, but in 1963, eighty-one percent had such
departments. 3 8 Factors influencing this trend toward encouraging
employee longevity included "[t] he labor legislation instituted by the
some Massachusetts textile mills was 163%. Id. at 737. The railroad companies of the mid-19th
century retained less than half their employees for more than six months. Id. In the early years
of the 20th century, turnover continued to be mind-boggling by today's standards. Id. at 738.
The majority of industrial workers changed jobs at least every three years. Id. At the Armour
meat packing plant in Chicago, for example, the average daily payroll numbered 8000 in 1914.
Id. In order to keep the workforce at that level, however, Armour had to hire 8000 workers
during the course of the year, continuously replacing the transient workers. Id. at 738. Daniel
Rodgers provides a detailed description of the problem:
Large surveys of textile mills, automobile plants, steel mills, clothing shops, and
machine works showed turnover rates at least as high as... 100 percent .... In the
woolen industry between 1907 and 1910, turnover varied between 113 and 163 percent
.... It reached 232 percent among NewYork City cloak, suit, and skirt shops in 1912-
13, 252 percent in a sample of Detroit factories in 1916, and the bewildering rate of
370 percent at Ford in 1913. The most extensive study, undertaken by the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistics and using data from 1913-14, found a "normal"
turnover rate in the factories of 115 percent, and, given the depressed economic
conditions in those years, that figure, if it erred at all, underestimated the normal
amount ofjob changing.
DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1850-1920, at 163 (1978); see
Finkin, supra note 57, at 738.
133. Finkin, supra note 57, at 737 (citing THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF MANUFACTURERS 250
(Nathan Rosenberg ed. 1969) (quoting George Wallis in his report to House of Commons
regarding visit to New York Industrial Exhibition in 1854)).
134. See Finkin, supra note 57, at 738-39 (noting that because of migratory tendencies of
employees in early 20th century, courts assumed relationship of "impermanence and
instability").
135. See Finkin, supra note 57, at 740-43 (discussing various methods used by employers to
reduce turnover, including employing personnel departments and other types of employee
welfare plans).
136. See Finkin, supra note 57, at 740-43 (noting how modem long-term relationship
following World War II was shaped by "New Deal, the centralization and professionalization of
personnel work, the impact of unionization, and the goods of personnel professionals"). The
attitude of the pre-World War II era is demonstrated by the story of a foreman who reported
to his superior that no one had been fired in the plant that day, at which point the superior
ordered the foreman to "'fire a couple of 'em'.... It'll put the fear of God in their hearts.'"
Id. at 740 (quoting SANFORD M.JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900-1945, at 21 (1985)) (citations omitted).
137. Finkin, supra note 57, at 742 (citingJACOBY, supra note 136, at 233).
138. Finkin, supra note 57, at 742 (citingJACOBY, supra note 136, at 233).
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able future.147
The logical corollary of the expectation of long-term employment
is the expectation that the employee will be protected against
wrongful discharge. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest
that employees intuitively infer that the law does, or at least should,
protect them from discharge without just cause.149 Just cause is a
standard provision in nearly all collective bargaining agreements
covering unionized employees.50 Although only a small minority
of American employees are represented by unions,'m many non-
union employees have worked in unionized settings in the past, while
others have worked for employers where at least part of the workforce
was unionized and protected by a collective bargaining agreement
that prohibited discipline or discharge without just cause.152 In
addition, managers and supervisors who oversee the work of at least
some unionized employees, or who have done so in the past, are
familiar with the just-cause standard. 15
147. Leonard, supra note 141, at 674. Professor Leonard opines:
Today employers and employees normally presume that employment which is not
expressly undertaken for a limited time will be long-term, provided some initial
probationary stage is successfully completed, the employee's work performance is
satisfactory, the employee has done nothing to damage the employer's business or
reputation, and the employer still requires performance of the job at issue.
Id.; see also Finkin, supra note 57, at 736-43 (describing how nature of employer-employee
relationship has evolved to where both parties expect employee to remain with employer over
long term).
148. See, e.g., Blackburn, supra note 9, at 482 ("Implying a right to reasonable, good cause,
discharges would serve to reflect the probable intent of the parties to the employment
relationship."); Malin, supra note 82, at 137 ("Limiting dismissal to just cause more accurately
reflects the unstated expectations of the parties than does permitting dismissal at will.").
149. Malin, supra note 82, at 136 ("The available empirical evidence suggests that the
intuitive inferences [of a just cause limitation on dismissals] drawn from extensive workplace
regulation are correct.") (citing BNA Personnel Policies Forum, PPF Survey No. 139 Employee
Discipline and Discharge (January 1985) (stating that 85% of unionized employers and 79% of
nonunionized employers have written expectations for employees; 94% of unionized and 93%
of nonunionized employers require progressive discipline; 98% of unionized and 99% of
nonunionized employers require consultation with at least one other official before supervisor
may suspend or discharge employee); BNA Personnel Policies Forum, PPF Survey No. 125,
Policies for Unorganized Employees (Apr. 1979) (stating that 82% of companies have written
rules of conduct for nonunion employees and 80% have complaint procedures whereby
employees may appeal disciplinary action)).
150. GOuLD, supra note 8, at 63 (finding that approximately 95% of collective bargaining
agreements provides "just cause" protection); Malin, supra note 82, at 135; see infra notes 258-86
and accompanying text (describing just-cause standard in Model Employment Termination Act
as substantially same as standard generally applied in labor arbitrations).
151. See infra note 194 and accompanying text (noting that union membership has dropped
from high of 35.5% in 1945 to record low of 15.8% in 1992).
152. See Malin, supra note 82, at 135 (noting that effects ofjust-cause protection in collective
bargaining agreements extend well beyond rapidly decreasing percentage of employees covered
by such agreements).
153. Malin, supra note 82, at 135.
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In addition to being influenced by knowledge of the protection
provided by collective bargaining agreements, the expectations of
both employees and employers have been affected by extensive
governmental regulation of the workplace." 4  "The myriad of
statutes and potential common law claims which have precluded bad-
cause discharges have stripped the claim that the parties intend the
employment relationship to be terminable at-will of any connection
to reality.""5 Many nonunion employers purport to dismiss employ-
ees only for just cause and practice progressive discipline similar to
that applied under a collective bargaining agreement. 56 The view
that protection against wrongful discharge is an expectation of the
parties is also consistent with what labor economists observe about
"how employers and employees actually interact."157
In view of the significantly altered expectations of employers and
employees, the anachronistic employment-at-will doctrine should be
abandoned to bring the law into accord with these reasonable
expectations. 58 The conduct required by the legal system should
be "derived from societal expectations,"'59 rather than simply from
an agreement between employer and employee." °
It is true that not all law is based on, or consistent with, societal
expectations. We do not systematically measure those expectations
and then structure the law to reflect them. 6' Nevertheless, societal
beliefs, which are the source of obligations reflected in tort law, shape
the content of the law. Indeed, it is axiomatic that "the gauge of
'reasonable' conduct, which is the touchstone of tort liability, is
societal values."162
154. Malin, supra note 82, at 136.
155. Malin, supra note 82, at 136; see also Alfred Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are
Entitled to "Just Cause"Protection Under Title V/, 2 INDUS. RE L.J. 519, 520 (1978) (arguing that
employment discrimination legislation alone has "imposed a de facto just cause limitation of
dismissals"); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law,
40 OHIO ST. LJ. 1, 19-21 (1979) (analyzing Professor Blumrosen's argument concerning
development of just cause limitation on dismissals).
156. Malin, supra note 82, at 136.
157. Malin, supra note 82, at 136.
158. See Leonard, supra note 141, at 674 (commenting that at-will doctrine does not
adequately reflect modem expectations of employees and employers).
159. See Elletta S. Callahan, Employment at WiL The Relationship Between Societal Expectations
and the Law, 28 AM. BUS. LJ. 455, 463 (1990) (stating that societal beliefs are relevant to law's
content).
160. The need to provide protection for employees through the law rather than simply
leaving them to rely upon whatever agreement they can reach with their employer is
underscored by the gross inequity in bargaining power between employers and employees. See
Gould, supra note 9, at 892-95.
161. Callahan, supra note 159, at 463 (stating that societal expectations sometimes need to
be overridden by legal or policy considerations).
162. Callahan, supra note 159, at 463 (citations omitted).
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Even if one rejects the premise that long-term employment and
protection against wrongful discharge are empirically the actual
expectations of society, one can still accept the claim that those
expectations are, aspirationally, reasonable and just. The claim is less
that these expectations are actually held by every employee in some
demonstrable, "subjective" sense, but more that the aspirations may
be attributed to every employee, and to the society as a whole, in a
normative "objective" sense. Alternatively, the postmodern account
might suggest that, particularly in the highly regulated sphere of
employer-employee relationships, the subjective expectations of the
employee are largely indistinguishable from the objective expectations
constructed by law. In either view, the argument that protection
against wrongful discharge is reflective of the reasonable, if not
probable, intent of the parties "appeals to considerations of corrective
justice."'63 If employers induce employees to work with seniority-
based wage scales and fringe benefits, as well as intimations of job
security, an employee terminated withoutjust cause has been paid less
than required by the original bargain.' The law should provide a
remedy for the resulting "transactional inequality" "as a matter of
corrective justice.' 65
This modem change in employee expectations gives rise to two
bases for rejecting the employment-at-will doctrine rooted entirely in
the common law: one based on theories of contract, and the other
based on theories of property.
1. Contract theory
Professor Clyde Summers has argued persuasively that the applica-
tion of modem contract law should provide protection from unjust
discharge.'66 Historically, employees were deemed to have no rights
under an implied contract of employment because there was no
163. Malin, supra note 82, at 137. Professor Malin, explaining the principles of corrective
justice and their application to employee termination, has observed:
Corrective justice ... is based on what Aristotle termed an arithmetic equality, in which
all individuals are treated as absolutely equal regardless of merit. Corrective justice
provides for the rectification of wrongs committed by one individual that cause harm
to another. Each individual who is harmed by a moral wrong committed by another
has a right to rectification, regardless of distributive merit.... The key purpose of
corrective justice is to redress damage caused by a moral wrong in a particular
transaction, and all individuals have an absolutely equal claim to such redress ....
Id. at 119.
164. Malin, supra note 82, at 137.
165. Malin, supra note 82, at 137.
166. Summers, supra note 42, at 1097-109.
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"mutuality of obligation. " " That doctrine, however, has generally
been repudiated." Today, in determining the terms of an oral or
implied contract, the courts look to the intent and expectations of the
parties. " Professor Summers concludes that the employment-at-will
doctrine has no basis in contract law, despite its contractual overtones,
because the courts "have not asked the basic contract question-what
did the parties intend?" 7 ' If the court considered such intent,
employment would cease to be at will."'
No employer can reasonably argue that an employee enters into a
job with the expectation that she can be discharged at the caprice of
the employer, regardless of the quality of her performance. It also
seems unlikely that an employer would argue that it hires new,
permanent employees with the express intention and expectation that
it may discharge them for any reason at all.'72 If asked at the time
of employment, the reasonable employer would surely profess a desire
to retain the employee so long as she performed well, and as long as
the company had no need to reduce its workforce for economic
reasons.'73 Likewise, the employee would almost certainly assert an
intent to stay for the foreseeable future. No reasonable employee
would accept a position if the prospective employer told her that she
could be fired at any time, without regard to herjob performance, for
167. Summers, supra note 42, at 1097-98 (detailing progression of mutuality doctrine through
recent court decisions).
168. Summers, supra note 42, at 1098 n.70. The early courts reasoned that because the
employee always had the right to voluntarily terminate her employment at any time without any
reason, the employer must have the right to discharge the employee at will. Id. The ill-
reasoned doctrine has been repudiated because contracts require only the exchange of
consideration rather than mutual obligations. Id. at 1098; see also St. Antoine, supra note 5, at
270 ("There is probably no more discredited concept in modem contract law than the
unqualified requirement of 'mutuality of obligation.'").
169. See, eg., FirstAlabama Bankv. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 619 So.2d 1313, 1318 (Ala. 1993)
(finding that implied contract requires mutual intent of parties); Radiology Assocs., PA v. St.
Clair Timber Co., 563 So.2d 1020, 1021 (Ala. 1991) (stating intent provides basis for finding
existence of implied contract); Butler v. Walker Power, Inc., 629 A.2d 91, 91 (N.H. 1993)
(looking to intent of parties to determine terms of implied contract of employment).
170. Summers, supra note 42, at 1099.
171. Summers, supra note 42, at 1100 ("The parties' understanding is not to be determined
by looking to the employer's presumed or secret intent to reserve the right to discharge without
notice or reason, but by looking to the understanding of the employee generated by the
employer's conduct both before and after the hiring.").
172. See Summers, supra note 42, at 1103-04. ButseeMurphyv. American Home Prod. Corp.,
448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983) (finding that at-will doctrine permitted employer to discharge
employee with impunity for refusing to participate in illegal manipulation of secret pension
reserves).
173. See Leonard, supra note 141, at 674 (explaining that original expectation of at-will
employeris to make termination decisions with reference to qualifications, performance, orvalid
economic factors).
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a good reason or a bad reason or even for no reason at all.' 74
Employers generally do not hire with the intention of firing any more
than employees accept job offers with the intention of quitting.
2. Property theory
In addition to the contractual rights described by Professor
Summers,17 this evolution in the nature of the intentions and
expectations of the parties when entering an employment relationship
has given birth to a nascent property right or quasi-property right in
employment.176 In the pre-Industrial Revolution era, most workers
aspired to be self-employed.1 77  Time spent as an apprentice or
employee of another was a step along the way to independence. The
dominant employer-employee relationship today is a creature of the
modem era.178  In the nineteenth century, a worker who lost a job
might have been able to survive by working a plot of land. In today's
urban environment, however, the loss of a job can be catastrophic.
No possession recognized by the law as "property" is more important
to the average citizen than her job.
79
No one would argue that under Anglo-American law, a person's
television, automobile, or home is not property. It seems anomalous,
therefore, to conclude that an employee has no property interest in
the job that provides the sole source of income to secure those
174. The reality, of course, is that employees do acceptjobs with employers, even when they
are aware that the employer can discharge them at will. Unfortunately, the realities of the
marketplace, contrary to the assertions of the labor economists, is that many employees must
acceptjob offers for employment that is clearly at will. See infra notes 197-210 and accompany.
ing text (discussing findings of law and economics scholars with respect to at-will employment).
Few employees are blessed with numerous job offers or have such bargaining power that they
may exercise the choice not to accept an at-will job.
175. Summers, supra note 42, at 1097-109.
176. See infra note 191 (identifying articles arguing for existence of property right in one's
job).
177. SeeJohn Bruntz, The Employee/Independent Contractor Dichotomy: A Rase Is Not Always a
Rose 8 HoFsTRA LAB. LJ. 337, 339-40 (1991) ("Prior to the Industrial Revolution, work was
performed largely by entrepreneurial craftsmen"; forces that caused independent contractors
to become employees were based in Industrial Revolution and development of mass
manufacturing).
178. The problem of industrial relations and modem conflicts between employees and
employers, for example, began to develop only after the Civil War. FRIEDMAN, supra note 27,
at 70. For further discussion of the change in employer and employee relations in the late 19th
century, see id. at 484-94.
179. Summers, supra note 72, at 532. Professor Summers argues that employment should
be protected as a property right because "for most employees, their job is the most valuable
thing that they possess; it is not a figure of speech buta statement of economic and social reality
to say that employees have property rights in theirjobs." Id. Professor Summers further asserts
that such valuable interests "have a compelling claim to legal protection" and should be
accorded statutory legal protection "just as unions have provided legal protection by contract
for many employees." Id.
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tangible items. Indeed, for many workers, a job may be their only
significant "property."" °
It is now well established that public employees have a property
right in their employment and the benefits thereof,' at least where
they have some reasonable expectation of continued employment.'82
The Supreme Court has read the definition of property quite broadly,
observing:
"[P]roperty interests"... are not limited by a few rigid, technical
forms. Rather, "property" denotes a broad range of interests that
are secured by "existing rules or understandings." A person's
interests in a benefit is a "property" interest for due process
purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings
that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit .... '8
According to the Court, the origin of the protected property right lies
not in the Constitution, but in "rules or understandings that secure
certain benefits and . . . support claims of entitlement to those
benefits."'84 In the public employment context, the courts generally
look to state law to find the existence of such a property right.1 85
Property rights in employment can, however, also be created by
ordinance or implied contract.
186
If analyzed in accordance with modem contract law, every
180. Reich, supra note 2, at 758. Professor Reich observes:
[T]oday more and more of our wealth takes the forms of rights or status rather than
of tangible goods. An individual's profession or occupation is a prime example. To
many others, a job with a particular employer is the principal form of wealth. A
profession or ajob is frequently far more valuable than a house or bank account, for
a new house can be bought, and a new bank account created, once a profession or job
is secure. For the jobless, their status as governmentally assisted or insured persons
may be the main source of subsistence.
Id.
181. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
182. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The Court in
Roth set out the guidelines for determining whether an employee has a protected property
interest in his job: "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.
He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id.
An employee cannot be deprived of such a constitutionally protected property right without
procedural due process. Id. In addition, arbitrary or capricious dismissals, which are supported
by no rational or reasonable state interest, may violate the public employee's substantive due
process rights. See Hixon v. Durbin, 545 F. Supp. 231, 238 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (requiring showing
that decision was not rationally related to legitimate interest in order to make successful
substantive due process challenge to termination).
183. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (citations omitted).
184. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. The Court opined that such protected property interests are
created and defined "by existing rules or understanding that stem from an independent source
such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims
of entitlement to those benefits." I&
185. Id.
186. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976).
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employer-employee relationship includes an implied contract of
employment.'87 The intent of the parties at the time they enter the
contract is that following a short probationary period, the employ-
ment will be long-term or "permanent," so long as the employee
performs satisfactorily."8 This implied contract creates the property
interest described by the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of
Education v. LoudermilL8 9 The incentives given by many employers
to induce employees to remain in their employment, such as wages
and salaries based on seniority, and pensions, profit-sharing plans, and
vacations tied to longevity, provide the employee additional
entitlements and strengthen his property claim."9
Just as the law would protect an employee if an employer attempted
to take the employee's wallet or home, the law should provide
protection from an employer's arbitrary or malicious discharge of the
employee. The parties anticipate at the outset that termination will
occur only for some legitimate reason. That premise gives the
employee the expectation necessary to create a property right.'9'
The concept of treating a job as property is also a fundamental
principle underlying the jurisprudence of labor arbitration.
19 2
187. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980) (holding that
employee has "certain implied contract rights to job security, necessary to ensure social stability
in our society").
188. Summers, supra note 42, at 1105 ("The employer normally intends that if the employee
proves satisfactory, she will be retained as long as needed; the employee normally assumes that
if she is satisfactory, she will continue to have ajob as long as she is needed."); see supra notes
141-65 and accompanying text (discussing current expectations of employers and employees).
189. 470 U.S. 532 (1985); cf. Shapiro & Tune, supra note 54, at 350-66 (discussing prior
development of implied contract property interest in Board of Regents v. Roth and Pey v.
Sindermann).
190. Leonard, supra note 141, at 633. Professor Arthur Leonard has suggested that the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988), which
governs benefit plans, has given employees "a property interest in continued employment by
strengthening legally enforceable interests which [relate] to benefit entitlements." Leonard,
supra.
191. Several authors have argued for the recognition of a property right in employment. See,
e.g., Gould, supra note 9, at 892 (offering statutory scheme under which property right to
employment would be protected adequately); Donald H.J. Hermann & Yvonne S. Sor, Property
Rights in One's Job: The Case for Limiting Employment-at-Will, 24 ARIZ. L. REv. 763 (1982)
(considering issue of whether salaried employee has plausible property right in herjob); Philip
J. Levin, Comment, Towards a Property Right in Employment, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 1081, 1108 (1973)
(concluding that property law should protect right to employment); Note, Unemployment as a
Taking Without Just Compensation, 43 S. CAi- L. REv. 488, 514-15 (1970) (maintaining that "job
property right" would fulfill important goals of American society).
192. See Summers, supra note 72, at 506 (stating that process of arbitration assumes that
employee has protected property right in herjob). Nearly all privately negotiated collective
bargaining agreements contain a provision for a grievance and arbitration procedure that
culminates in binding arbitration. Such arbitration is the preferred way of resolving labor
disputes in the United States. See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S.
235, 242-43 (1970) (emphasizing importance of arbitration to federal labor dispute resolution
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Arbitration law recognizes that "an employee's job may be his most
valuable asset," one that increases with the length of his service.193
Although only a minority of American workers are represented by
labor unions and protected by collective bargaining agreements,
194
many more have worked with union protection in the past, or are
familiar with the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement from
the experiences of friends and relatives. 95 There can be little
doubt that, unlike employees of the past century, today's employee
views her employment with a "sense of entitlement," and counts it as
part of her acquired property.
1 96
Law-and-economics scholars have rejected the premise that an
employee has a legally recognized interest in employment, arguing
forcefully that the employment-at-will doctrine should be retained
because it serves the interests of the marketplace. 97  Professor
Richard Epstein, for example, hypothesizes that, because employees
are free to terminate their employment voluntarily and go elsewhere
if an employer acts arbitrarily and capriciously, the employer likewise
has the freedom to fire at will.' 98 He assumes that an employer who
mistreats employees will develop a negative reputation within the
community and will be unable to hire good employees. This
policy); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,578 (1960) ("[T]he
present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining
agreement. A major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for
arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement.") (citations omitted). After
nearly 60 years of such arbitrations, a substantial body of arbitral law has been developed.
As ProfessorJ. Noble Braden has written:
There was a time when a worker's job was a thing of the hour, he could be hired or
fired at will, and his only right was to be paid for the hour he worked. Today, the job
has become a thing of value... the worker has come to have what might be called a
property right in his job. His wages and benefits generally accrue with seniority, which
increases the value of his job as time goes on .... Like any other property holder in
our free, democratic society, he cannot be deprived of his rights except by due process.
J. Noble Braden, From Conflict to Cooperation, SIXTH ANNUAL LABOR RELATIONS CONFERENCE 43
(Inst. of Indus. Rel., W. Va. Univ., 1956).
193. Summers, supra note 72, at 506.
194. Poportionfor Union MembersDeclines to Low of l5.8 Percent, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25,
Feb. 9, 1993, at B-3. In 1992, only 18.6 million workers were represented by unions, out of a
total labor force of 103.7 million. Id.
195. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing how protection afforded by
collective bargaining agreements extends to nonunion employees).
196. Finkin, supra note 57, at 742 (citations omitted). Professor Finkin notes that our
contemporary consumer credit economy reflects the assumption of a stable, continuing
employment. Id.
197. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Wi4 51 U. CHi. L. REv. 947, 951
(1984) (maintaining that at-will contract is supported by principles of freedom of contract and
rules of construction).
198. See id.
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hypothesis, however, is the stuff of fantasy.1" It completely ignores
industrial reality.
2tu
First, employees do not have the luxury of quitting when they feel
the employer has been unfair because the probability of obtaining a
comparable job is low.2 01  The cold chill of that reality has been
driven home by the moribund economy of recent years. Many highly
qualified managers and professionals, including lawyers, as well as
countless blue-collar and less skilled workers, have been unsuccessfully
seeking employment.2 2 Traditionally stalwart industrial giants such
as Proctor and Gamble and IBM have recently laid off workers for the
first time in their history.2 3  Moreover, older, more senior employ-
ees will be unable to obtain comparable employment. The economic
reality is that employers are inclined to hire younger, less expensive
employees rather than older, higher paid persons. 204  For senior
199. Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full
Flower, 67 NEB. L. REv. 56, 67 (1988). St. Antoine writes:
A wondrous Oz-like air of unreality pervades much of the... thesis. [The] analysis
admits of no living, breathing human beings, who develop irrational antagonisms or
exercise poor judgement, on the one hand, or who suffer the psychological as well as
the economic devastation of losing a job, on the other.
Id.
200. See Malin, supra note 82, at 139-145 (stating that "prevalence ofjob security devices in
nonunionized workplaces," among other things, undermines assertion that at-will employment
doctrine efficiently allocates power between employers and workers); St. Antoine, supra note 199,
at 67-70 (stating that in industrial setting, employees seldom quit voluntarily). Law-and-
economics scholars also point to Europe, where employees enjoy statutory protection against
wrongful discharge, arguing that Europe's higher rate of unemployment is directly attributable
to such job-protection legislation. Gould, supra note 100, at 420. Employers, the conservative
scholars argue, are "reluctant to hire and anxious to fire" employees "whom security has made
lethargic." Id. at 420-21. The most obvious rebuttal of this premise is the successful German
economy. Germany has pioneered social legislation for workers, but nevertheless has developed
a highly successful economy. Id. at 421. In addition, strong evidence suggests that the cause
of higher unemployment is pay compression, which makes hiring new workers an expensive
proposition. Id.
201. See St. Antoine, supra note 199, at 67-68 ("[I]n the real world of industrial relations,
employees seldom quit voluntarily."). Most workers "regard resort to the market-that is, a
change of employers-as a disaster rather than as an opportunity." Id. at 68 n.74; see also
Blackburn, supra note 9, at 470 (noting that in era of high unemployment, employee's need for
steady employment undermines any theoretical power to freely terminate employment contract);
Malin, supra note 82, at 143 ("It is far easier for a wrongfully discharged employee to obtain
comparable other employment in the fertile imagination of Professor Epstein than it is in
reality.").
202. James Barron, 400 Jobs for Lawyers Who Don't Want to Be Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
1994, at B18 (citing high unemployment rate for lawyers).
203. Barbara Koeppel, American's Labor Lost; For Airline Workers the Crash Can Be Fata WASH.
POST, Sept. 5, 1993, at CI (citing IBM announcement to lay off 85,000 workers and Proctor &
Gamble's plan to lay off 15,000 workers).
204. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 415 (1988) (Kaufman, J., dissenting)
("Whatever bargaining strength and marketability the employee may have at the moment of
hiring, diminishes rapidly thereafter. Marketplace? What market is there for the factory worker
laid off after 25 years of labor in the same plant, or for the middle-aged executive fired after 25
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employees, moving to another employer may result in a significant
reduction in retirement benefits as well. 5
Second, there is no Consumer Reports of employment.2°6 Employ-
ees simply do not have access to advertising, research, or other data
that would allow them to evaluate the benevolence, or lack thereof,
of prospective employers. The probability of an employer developing
a reputation regarding employee discharge that would adversely affect
its ability to hire is remote, with the possible exception of a large,
visible employer in a small, tight-knit community.
Finally, economists ignore the economic and virtual reality of
today's employment marketplace. The employment-at-will doctrine
evolved at a time when young boys still served as apprentices with the
anticipation of learning a trade and eventually becoming self-
employed. 2°7  Even large businesses were relatively small by today's
standards. Currently, many major American corporations are the size
of small countries.2 ' Employees are at a clear disadvantage in
bargaining in the modem marketplace, even with smaller employers.
Except for those few employees who may possess skills or talents that
are in extraordinarily short supply, most employees are forced to take
what the employer offers.2 9 Only those at the very highest level of
years with the same firm?"). Such age discrimination is prohibited by the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988). The practice continues, however, to pervade
the employment arena. L.M. Sixel, Discrimination Haunts Many Older Wohers, PHOENIX GAZETTE,
Aug. 18, 1993, at Cl.
205. WELER, supra note 9, at 65-66. Typical defined benefit plans provide a sum certain at
retirement based upon years of experience with the employer and the years of highest salary.
There is an exponential increase in benefits in the later years of employment. Thus, for
example, an employee with 15 years experience at company A who at age 50 moved to company
B and worked another 15 years, would, quite likely, receive less in combined pension benefits
than if he had remained at company A for the full 30 years. Id.
206. Malin, supra note 82, at 143 (citing absence of consumer information on jobs).
207. See supra notes 42-126 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of employment-at-
will doctrine).
208. See Ruth Weyand, Present Status ofIndividualEmployee Rights, 1970 PROC. OF N.Y.U. 22ND
ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 171, 215 (citing JOHN K. GALBRArIH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 76
(1967)). Weyand noted that the gross revenues of several corporations exceeded those of any
single state. In fact, the revenues of General Motors alone in 1963 were "fifty times those of
Nevada, eight times those of New York, and slightly less than one fifth those of the Federal
Government." Id.
209. Blades, supra note 10, at 1411-12 (observing that individual workers do not have
bargaining power to create contracts that provide for dismissal for just cause only); Peter D.
DeChiara, Rethinking the Managerial-Professional Exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 43 AM.
U. L. REV. 139, 166-67 (1993) (noting that most managerial and professional employees lack
bargaining power relative to their employers); Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States:
Preemption and the Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 559 (1993) (noting that congressional adoption of National Labor
Relations Act was premised on "the assumption that individual employment bargains [lack]
legitimacy because of bargaining power disparities"); Elizabeth Flagg, Note, Insurance Agents Slip
Through the "Good Hands" of ERISA: 'Employee" Defined by Agency Principles in Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company v. Darden, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1099, 1128 (1993) (noting that
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management can negotiate contracts with "golden parachutes" or
other provisions to protect them from wrongful discharge. 10 For
most employees, the only source of real job security and protection
lies within the law.
Another often overlooked factor is the reality of the operation of
large corporate employers. Many national and international
employers honestly seek to treat employees fairly by conducting
seminars and creating manuals in an effort to sensitize their manage-
rial work force and to facilitate fair treatment of employees. A
corporation's efforts, however, cannot control the actions of every
supervisor. Some supervisors will continue to harass and wrongfully
discharge employees despite the corporation's best efforts.2"
In recent years, there has been a small but growing trend toward
developing cooperation in labor-management relations and empower-
ing workers by allowing them more direct involvement in
decisionmaking and control over their work life.212 Employees are
generally more concerned with working conditions and job security
than with compensation. 213  Providing statutory protection against
wrongful discharge for employees would be consistent with this
modern trend toward "humanizing the workplace" by moving away
from the harsh working conditions prevalent during the period of
industrialization in America.21 4
employers are able to abuse workers' pension rights because employees are economically
dependent upon employer and therefore have "very little bargaining power," and "[a]n
employee with little bargaining power has no control over the terms and conditions of the
employment relationship").
210. See O'Connor, supra note 10, at 1215 ("Although golden parachutes often compensate
upper-level managers ... these devices rarely cover lower-level employees.").
211. For example, several years ago, the author represented an employee who filed a charge
against a Fortune 500 pharmaceutical company for sex discrimination. The employee was a sales
representative. Her supervisor continuously subjected her to sexually suggestive and other
harassing comments. As a result, she suffered severe anxiety and depression and needed
psychiatric care. The employer, however, has an outstanding record of trying to eradicate
discrimination in its organization. It prides itself on treating its employees well. With thousands
of employees throughout the country, however, it cannot control the acts of all.
Similarly, Professor Paul Weiler tells the story of a low level management employee of IBM,
a company that is the "paragon of a nonunion firm," who was discharged by her superior for
dating an employee of a smaller competitor of IBM. WEILER, supra note 9, at 62 n.31. The
discharge occurred despite the elaborate policies IBM developed to protect the rights and
interests of employees. Id.
212. See WEILER, supra note 9, at 191-224 (discussing increase in employee involvement
throughout development of American unions but recognizing need for reform to further foster
worker participation).
213. See Quality of Work Environment Important to U.S. Workers, Study Says, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 170, at D-13 (Sept. 3, 1993).
214. Leonard, supra note 141, at 678.
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B. The Need for a Federal Statute
Courts in many states, endeavoring to recognize some protection
for employees, have applied modem jurisprudence to the antiquated
employment-at-will doctrine.215 Nonetheless, few if any courts have
felt sufficiently empowered to bury the doctrine completely. In three
states, employees still have no protection at all.21 6 In seventeen
states, employees have no clear contractual protection. 217  In the
majority of states, employees have no protection against employer bad
faith or malevolent conduct.
21 8
In the absence of a statute, wrongfully discharged employees are
left in a state of chaos and uncertainty, "the worst of all possible
worlds."2 1 9 First, they must find an attorney who is familiar with the
various theories of recovery in employment-at-will cases.220  The
attorney is then faced with the task of searching employment manuals,
pension plans, letters, and other documents in an effort to find some
basis for a claim premised on a written contract.221 Even if there
appears to be some basis for a claim of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy, there is no guarantee that the court will
recognize the public policy at issue.
Moreover, there are limits to what even the most progressive court
can do. Prevailing employees are not generally entitled to recover
attorney's fees.222 Yet, the litigation costs may well approach or
exceed the amount of recovery.223 Without a statute, recovery will
be limited to middle- and upper-management employees because only
215. See, e.g., Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 416 S.E.2d 166, 170 (N.C. 1992) (recognizing
public policy exceptions to at-will doctrine); Rogers v. Targot Telemarketing Serv., 591 N.E.2d
1332, 1334 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (citing promissory estoppel exception to at-will doctrine).
Some critics would argue that the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine represents a prime
example ofjudicial activism. But see Finkin, supra note 57, at 751 (noting that eroding at-will
doctrine was not so active or creative; rather erosion was an adaptation of business to societal
changes).
216. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting Florida, Louisiana, and Rhode Island
as three states without exceptions to employment-at-will doctrine).
217. The following states have no case law, or other clear expression of policy, that would
provide contractual protection to employees: Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51-52
(1994).
218. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (listing comparative few states that recognize
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
219. Gould, supra note 100, at 413.
220. This task is growing easier with the evolution of the National Employment Lawyers
Association, an organization composed primarily of plaintiffs' employment lawyers. The number
of such lawyers in many areas, however, is quite small.
221. Gould, supra note 100, at 413.
222. See Gould, supra note 100, at 413.
223. See Gould, supra note 100, at 413.
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their incomes, and the potential damages they might be awarded for
lost income, are large enough to provide contingency-based compen-
sation for an attorney.224 Under the current system, the fifteen,
twenty, or thirty thousand dollar-a-year worker simply cannot find
anyone to represent him, unless his attorney is willing to undertake
the matter on a pro bono basis.2" In addition, the costs of employ-
ment litigation, exclusive of attorney fees, can be substantial. Travel
costs, depositions, photocopying, expert witnesses, and similar costs
can easily run into the tens of thousands of dollars.2 Because the
plaintiff cannot recover these costs at common law, she must pay
them from any recovery obtained.227  Unless the unemployed
plaintiff has substantial cash reserves, or the attorney is in a position
to advance those costs, the litigation cannot proceed.
There are those who naively assume that employers generally do
not mistreat employees or arbitrarily dismiss them, and, as a result,
see no need for a change in the law. One need only look at the
impact of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 s however, to
understand the importance of statutory protection for employment.
Prior to the enactment of title VII, many employers discriminated as
a matter of course on the basis of gender, race, religion, and ethnic
origin. The impact of the statute on the workforce is evidenced by
the positions occupied by women, blacks, and other minorities that
werejust a generation ago, the bastion of white males. Despite these
legal advancements, however, employment discrimination continues
to exist.21 Congress has responded by enacting the Civil Rights Act
of 1991,2 ° which, among other things, allows employees to recover
damages from employers who violate the law.231
The authors of the Model Employment Termination Act, as well as
several commentators, view state statutes as the most appropriate
224. See Gould, supra note 100, at 413.
225. See Gould, supra note 100, at 413; St. Antoine, supra note 5, at 277-78 ("Rank and file
workers who are fired usually have too little money at stake to make their case worthwhile for
lawyers operating on a contingent fee basis.").
226. See Gould, supra note 100, at 413 (estimating litigation costs exclusive of attorney's fees
at $10,000 in 1987).
227. See Gould, supra note 100, at 414.
228. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
229. See Amy Saltzman, Trouble at the top, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., June 17, 1991, at 40
(discussing government report that concluded that in major corporations "women's routes to
the top are blocked by a 'glass ceiling' of subtle discrimination" that limits their opportunities).
230. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 29, and
42 U.S.C.).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
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means of addressing the problem of wrongful discharge. 2 Only a
federal statute, however, will provide employees with the protection
they need and deserve. Conceptually, the Model Act is a step in the
right direction, but it is not enough.
First, our national experience with uniform and model acts suggests
that it will be years before any appreciable number of states adopt the
Model Act and that many states will never adopt such legislation.2 "
Over the last several years, at least ten states have considered
employment termination legislation, 4 but only one state has
actually adopted it.2" 5 There is no reason to believe that any
appreciable number of states will adopt the Model Act or any
variation thereof anytime soon.
236
Second, our experience has shown that the most effective way to
address employment issues of national import is through federal
legislation. Congress has the power, under the Commerce
Clause,237 to regulate employment.238  It has seen fit to do so in
myriad ways.21' For example, in 1935, Congress adopted theNational Labor Relations Act (NLRA),24° which recognized the
232. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra note 5, at 218 (identifying defects existing in common-law
regime and promoting enactment of state statutes as remedy).
233. Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the United States, 44 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REv. 644, 658-59 (1991) (suggesting that only one state has been successful in
passing wrongful termination legislation because threat to employers under common law is not
great enough in most states to provoke sufficient support for legislation and nontrivial waiting
period is often required before legislation can be steered through legislature).
234. The 10 states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. Krueger, supra note 233, at 650. At least
40 states and territories have introduced bills in the past decade concerning "employment
termination, at-will employment, or a related subject." MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACr,
supra note 7, at prefatory note 540:23.
235. Krueger, supra note 233, at 650.
236. For example, a "uniform termination act," which prohibited certain employers from
terminating certain employees without good cause, was introduced into the New Hampshire
Legislature in 1993. H.R. 513, N.H. Leg. (1993). On March 17, 1993, the legislature rejected
it.
Ironically, New Hampshire courts have taken some leadership in the area of wrongful
discharge litigation. The state was the first to recognize an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in the employment relationship. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549,551
(N.H. 1974) (holding that employer's termination employment-at-will employee is not in best
interest of economic system or public good where termination is motivated by bad faith).
237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.2.
238. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1937) (holding that
Congress' power to regulate employment is vested in its ability to enact statutes that make labor
disputes part of "commerce").
239. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988) (setting standards
and prohibitions for employers and employees with respect to organization and representation);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988) (prohibiting employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988) (imposing wage and hour standards).
240. Pub. L No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988)).
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inequality of bargaining power between employees and employers and
the need for employees to unite if they were to have any hope of
balancing the inequality.
2 41
Third, federal legislation in this area will promote uniformity of
decisions among the states,242 which is, of course, also a compelling
argument asserted in support of the Model Act.23  In this modem
era of complex interstate and international commerce, the notion of
uniformity demands attention. A corporation with production
facilities in both Kansas and Pennsylvania should not be subject to two
separate statutes governing discharge of its employees. The logic that
gave birth to the National Labor Relations Act, title VII, and a
generation of other employment legislation2 now obliges us to
provide federal protection for all employees against wrongful
discharge. 4 Such legislation should follow the title VII model and
allow states to establish their own laws and enforcement mechanisms,
so long as the federal legislation establishes minimum standards.
2 46
But the impetus must come from Congress.
The United States stands alone among the world's major industrial-
ized nations in failing to protect employees from wrongful discharge
241. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157. Unfortunately, unions have not been the answer for most
American employees. Union membership has steadily declined over the last few decades. Only
three-fifths of union members are now in the private sector, where they make up just 11.5% of
that workforce. The remaining members are in government, where they constitute 36.7% of the
workforce. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at B-3 (Feb. 9, 1993).
Although there are various reasons for the decline in union membership, a substantial share
of the responsibility mustbe attributed to the increasingly"no-holds barred" resistance exhibited
by American business toward unions. See WEILER, supra note 9, at 114.
242. Cf Jack Stieber & Michael Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a
Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH.J. L. REF. 319, 336 (1983) ("[A]ny attempt to introduce protection
against unjust discharge into a single state would almost certainly be met with the argument that
the additional burden on employers would make that state less attractive to industrial and
commercial development").
243. See generally MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, prefatory note
(discussing conference findings favoring creation of uniform Act).
244. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV
1992) (prohibiting discrimination in employment because of physical disability or mental
impairment); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988) (prohibiting
discrimination in employment against persons over age of 40).
245. See Blades, supra note 10, at 1433. Professor Blades writes:
[I~t seems anomalous that these [civil rights and fair employment commissions]
provide relief to an employee who is discharged because of his race or religion yet do
not grant similar relief to an employee who is discharged because he exercised his
right of free speech or because he refused to commit some fraud or crime at his
employer's behest.
Id.
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988) (providing that under tide VII, state law shall continue
in force provided that it is not inconsistent with federal act).
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through federal legislation.2 47  Such protection was first proposed
by the International Labor Organization (ILO)214 in 1963.249 In
1982, the ILO's recommendation was modified and approved as a
Convention.' The time has come for us to join the community of
nations in protecting employees from wrongful termination.
III. THE MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT
A. Adoption of a Model Act Instead of a Uniform Act
The Model Employment Termination Act is unquestionably a
creature of compromise, a compromise necessary to gain support
from both employer and employee interests. 51 The efforts to find
consensus, however, have emaciated the statute. For example, the
Model Act was originally designed as a uniform act. 2 The goal of
a uniform act is to achieve uniformity among the states so that
multistate employers will not have to comply with an array of different
statutes. 3 With a uniform act, it is understood that states will
adopt the act substantially as written, without material modifica-
tion. 54 A model act, on the other hand, provides more of a blue-
247. See St. Antoine, supra note 199, at 68-69; see also supra note 23 (noting that more than
60 countries provide statutory protection from wrongful discharge).
248. The International Labor Organization (ILO) is the oldest independent arm of the
United Nations. There are currently 150 member countries in the ILO. INTERNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION, FACTs FORAMERICANS 5 (1989). Member nations are represented by teams from
management, labor, and government Id.
249. See INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE
INITIATIVE OF THE EMPLOYER: RECOMMENDATION 119 (1963). An ILO Recommendation is not
intended to be ratified, but is to be "used as a guideline for national policy and action."
Stephen I. Schlossberg, United States' Participation in the ILO: Redefining the Roe 11 CoMp. LAB.
LJ. 48, 51 (1989). ILO recommendations are utilized when the subject matter is new and the
standard is exploratory. Id. Recommendations are intended to influence national legislation.
Id. at 58.
250. See INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE
INITIATIVE OF THE EMPLOYER, CONVENTION 158 (1982) [hereinafter CONVENTION 158];
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING TERMINATION OF
EMPLOYMENT AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE EMPLOYER (1982).
Convention 158 requires that the employment of a worker "shall not be terminated unless
there is a valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the
worker or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service."
CONVENTION 158, supra. It also provides for a pretermination hearing, absent unusual
circumstances, reasonable notice to the employee to be terminated, and severance or unemploy-
ment benefits. Id. at arts. 4, 8, 11, 12. The United States refused to sign or ratify Convention
No. 158. Int'l Labor Conference, 68th Sess., 1982, Termination of Employment at the Initiative
of the Employer, Report V(1) and (2).
251. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, prefatory note (describing Act
as result of compromise among competing interests).
252. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, prefatory note.
253. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, prefatory note.
254. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (comparing uniform act to model act).
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print for the states. 5 State legislatures are free to modify a model
act to reflect their own needs and attitudes.256 Changing the
uniform act to a model act has compromised the commissioners'
often-stated goal of uniformity," v thereby significantly weakening
the Act.
B. The Good Cause Requirement
The heart of the Model Act lies in section 3, which provides that an
employer may not discharge an employee without "good cause."M
The concept of "good cause" is substantially the same as the standard
generally applied in labor arbitrations. 9 Good cause requires both
"a reasonable basis" for termination of an employee "in view of
relevant factors and circumstances" 2 ° and the "exercise of business
judgement in good faith" by the employer.26 ' Relevant factors and
circumstances that may be considered in determining good cause
include the employee's duties and responsibilities,262 the employee's
conduct on the job "or otherwise,"2 3 and the employee's job
performance or general employment record.2' Examples of good
cause include "theft, assault, fighting on the job, destruction of
property, use or possession of drugs or alcohol on the job, insubordi-
255. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (recognizing that model act provides
guidelines, but is not usually adopted in full).
256. See supra note 31.
257. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, prefatory note (discussing
deliberations and noting desirability of uniformity).
258. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AT, supra note 7, § 3. Section 3 of the Model Act,
entitled Prohibited Terminations, provides that "[u]nless otherwise provided in an agreement
for severance pay ... or for a specified duration ... an employer may not terminate the
employment of an employee without good cause." Id.
259. See St. Antoine, supra note 5, at 281 (noting that "good cause" requirement in Act and
in labor arbitrations, both "emphasize the economic flexibility accorded the employer").
260. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 1(4) (i).
261. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 1(4) (ii). The Model Act defines
"good cause" as follows:
(i) [A] reasonable basis related to an individual employee for termination of the
employee's employment in view of relevant factors and circumstances, which may
include the employee's duties, responsibilities, conduct on the job or otherwise, job
performance, and employment record, or (ii) the exercise of business judgement in
good faith by the employer, including setting its economic or institutional goals and
determining methods to achieve those goals, organizing or reorganizing operations,
discontinuing, consolidating, or divesting operations or positions or parts of operations
or positions, determining the size of its work force and the nature of the positions
filled by its work force, and determining and changing standards of performance for
positions.
Id. § 1(4).
262. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AT, supra note 7, § 1(4) (i).
263. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 1(4) (i).
264. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 1(4) (i).
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nation, excessive absenteeism or tardiness, incompetence, lack of
productivity, and inadequate performance or neglect of duty."
26
The employee's conduct need not occur during working hours or at
the employer's place of business. An employee's off-duty conduct can
constitute good cause for discharge if it is relevant to job perfor-
mance, the employer's business reputation, or similar concerns.
2
The Act also protects employees who lose their jobs through
dismissal, layoff, or suspension for more than two consecutive months
by providing a remedy if these discharges lack good cause.267
"Dismissal" is defined as termination resulting from the elimination
of a position.
26
The Act takes the additional bold step of protecting employees
against constructive discharge, which occurs when an employee quits
or retires because of intolerable circumstances created by an
employer.269  For example, an employee who is the victim of
continuous sexual or racial harassment and who quits or retires
because of the stress created by the harassment would still have a
claim under the Act.
27
Under the Model Act, reasons of race, gender, religion, or other
statutorily prohibited discrimination do not constitute good cause.27'
In fact, findings from discrimination-based proceedings may be used
as evidence in proceedings under the Act 2  A finding that a
particular discharge does not constitute statutorily prohibited
discriminatory conduct does not, however, preclude a finding that the
discharge was without good cause as defined in the Act.
273
To defend the discharge of an employee under the Act, an
employer would have to do more than merely demonstrate that the
265. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 1 cmt. 4.
266. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 1 cmt 4. This provision is
consistentwith the general approach in labor arbitration. An employer cannot usually discharge
an employee for off-the-job conduct unless the conduct has some relationship to or bearing on
the employee's work. See generally FRANK ELROURI 8& EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION
WoRKs 656-57 (1985) (addressing issue of employee conduct away from plant).
267. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 1(8) (defining "termina-
tion").
268. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 1(8) (i).
269. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 1(8) (iii) (providing that
quitting or retirement induced by intolerable act or omission of employer, after notice to
employer of act or omission without appropriate relief by employer, constitutes termination of
employment). The notion of intolerable employment may consist of more than one act or
omission or course of conduct by an employer. Id.
270. Such an employee would also, of course, have a claim under title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988), which prohibits discrimination based, inter
alia, on gender or race.
271. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 3 cmL a.
272. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 3 cmL a.
273. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 3 cmt. a.
1994] 893
894 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:849
employee did something wrong. The Act borrows from the tradition
of labor arbitration by requiring the fact finder, when determining
good cause, to consider mitigating factors, such as whether the
violated company rule was reasonable and whether the seriousness of
the infraction warranted discharge of the employee. 4  In contrast
to traditional labor arbitrations, however, the Act places the burden
on the employee to prove that the discharge was not for good
cause,275 although the employer will normally present its case first
in the proceeding.
27 6
The Act is not a plant closing bill,77 and it takes pains not to
infringe on an employer's right to make legitimate business decisions
that may result in employee discharge or layoffs.278 In fact, the Act
274. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 1 cmL 4. Under the Act, the
fact finder must consider the following factors when determining good cause:
... the reasonableness of the company rule violated, the employee's knowledge or
warning of the rule, the consistency of enforcement of the rule and the penalties
assessed, the use of corrective or progressive discipline, the fullness and fairness of the
investigation including the opportunity given the employee to present his or her views
prior to dismissal, and the appropriateness of the penalty in light of the conduct
involved and the employee's employment record.
Id.; cf. Erzoum & ELKouiu, supra note 266, at 670-88 (evaluating due process and procedure in
disciplinary action); Gould, supra note 100, at 408 (stating that under just cause standard,
employers "must use progressive discipline, that is they must warn, counsel, and even suspend
employees before [dismissing them]").
Under the Model Act, consideration is also given to "the character of the employee's
responsibilities," including the character of his work, the management level of the employee's
position in the business, and the importance of the position to the success of the employer's
business. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AT, supra note 7, § 1 cmt. 4.
275. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 6(e). The employee also has
the burden of proof in cases alleging that an employer breached an agreement for severance
pay. Id.
The Act has an interesting provision whereby an employer can, in effect, seek a declaratory
judgment based on a claim that it has good cause to discharge an employee. Id. § 5(c). In such
cases, the burden of proof falls on the employer. Id. § 6(e).
276. The requirement that the employer "go first" in the proceedings applies in all cases
except those in which the employee alleges that "a quitting or retirement was a termination" as
defined in § 1(8) of the AcL MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 6(e).
277. Model Employment Termination Act, supra note 7, § 1(4) cmL
278. See, e.g., MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 1 cmL 4. The Act
provides that good cause shall include:
(ii) the exercise of business judgement in good faith by the employer, including setting
its economic or institutional goals and determining methods to achieve those goals,
organizing or reorganizing operations, discontinuing, consolidating, or divesting
operations or positions or parts of operations or positions, determining the size of its
work force and the nature of the positions filled by its work force, and determining
and changing standards of performance for positions. This list of employer
prerogatives is intended to "invoke the principle of ejusdem generis" in determining the
parameters of employer freedom.
Id. This employer prerogative includes the right to entirely shut down its operation. If,
however, an employer discriminates against certain employees in deciding whom to lay off, or
if the layoff is a sham, the employer would not meet the good cause requirement. Id.
THE MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT
expressly acknowledges the employer's right to set "economic or
institutional goals" 279 so long as it acts in "good faith."28 °  The
employer also remains free to set standards of performance for its
employees.2  The Act anticipates that standards will depend on the
nature of the particular position. 82 For instance, the standard of
"the most proficient performer available for a particular position"
283
is acceptable in fields that are "traditionally or inherently highly
competitive," like professional sports, the entertainment industry, the
professions, and university teaching.284 In addition, the employer
may change the standard at any time, provided that the employer
communicates the changes to employees.2 ' The Act also allows the
employer and the employee to agree by contract that the employee's
failure to meet "specified business-related standards of performance"
or "the employee's commission or omission of specified business-
related acts" will constitute good cause.286
C. Persons Covered by the Act
The Act does not reach all employers or all employees. Only
employers who have five or more employees are covered. 7 In
addition, the Act excludes state, municipal, and other governmental
entities, as well as employment settings in which the employee is a
member of the employer's immediate family or related to anyone
having a controlling interest in the employer's business. 88 Employ-
ees are protected only after one year of employment, and only if they
work at least half-time.28 9 The statute does not apply to the termina-
279. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr, supra note 7, § 1(4) (ii).
280. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr, supra note 7, § 1(5) (defining "good faith"
as "honesty in fact"). The question of what constitutes "good faith" generated extensive
discussion among the Commissioners at their 1990 meeting. The major debate centered over
whether the standard was an objective or subjective one. The comments advise that business
decisions must reflect "honest business judgmenL" Id. § 1(4) cmL
281. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 1 cmL 4 (noting that
although employer may change standards for any employment positions, altered standards must
be clearly communicated to employees).
282. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 1 cmL 4.
283. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 1 cmL 4.
284. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § I cmL 4.
285. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 1 cmL 4.
286. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 4(b).
287. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 1(2) (providing that employers
are only covered if they have had five or more employees for at least 20 weeks during preceding
two years).
288. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr, supra note 7, § 1(2).
289. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 3(b) (requiring that
employees work at least 520 hours during 26 weeks preceding termination, and total of one year
or more of work). Layoffs or other breaks in service do not count in calculating the one-year
period. Id. The 26 weeks exclude time attributed to layoffs of one year or less, paid vacations,
1994]
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tion of employment at the expiration of an express contract of
employment. 90
Those employees who are covered under the Act, however, lose
virtually all "common law rights and claims"291 that arise from a
termination or "acts taken or statements made that are reasonably
necessary to initiate or effect the termination."292 For example, the
Act precludes an employee from making any tort claim for defama-
tion,29 intentional infliction of emotional distress, or wrongful
discharge, or from filing suit against her employer under a contract
theory.29 4  Except for other independent statutory remedies that
may be available," employees are completely limited to seeking
recovery under the Model Act. 96 Employees who are not protected
by the Act, such as part-time workers and employees with less than
one year's tenure, retain their common-law rights.297
Union employees are, of course, protected by the terms of their
collective bargaining agreement. The Act recognizes that state law
cannot interfere with union employees' rights established under
federal law. 98 To the extent that there is no preemption prob-
lem," however, union employees may also enjoy the benefits of the
authorized leaves, or labor disputes. Id.
290. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 2(b).
291. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 2(d); see also id. § 2 cmL c
(abolishing tort actions in favor of statutory protections).
292. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 2(c). The employee does,
however, retain the right to assert independent tort actions for such actions as assault, malicious
prosection, and false imprisonment "if there are independent facts separate and apart from the
termination itself to support such causes of action." Id.
293. The Act specifically addresses one employer's report to another regarding an
employee's performance, and deems it governed by the doctrine of qualified privilege. MODEL
EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 2(c) cmt.
294. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 2(c) cmL This comment
clarifies that the nature of the tort is not at issue. Rather, the inquiry is whether the basis of the
tort is the actual termination or statements made that effect the termination. Id.
295. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 2(e) (noting that Act does
not displace claims arising under state or federal statutes or administrative rules or regulations).
Other remedies would include discrimination claims brought under title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (Supp. IV 1992). Employees can also bring claims predicated on rights
provided under whistleblower laws that protect employees who report an employer's
wrongdoing. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428(2) (Callaghan 1982) (protecting employees
who report employer's wrongdoing); OHIO REV. CODEANN. §4113.52 (Baldwin 1991) (providing
that employee has right to report violation of law by employer or fellow employee).
296. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 2(e) (providing that rights
enumerated in Act are only rights plaintiffs may assert in wrongful termination action).
297. Seegenerally MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 2 (providing general
scope of Act).
298. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 2 cmL e.
299. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 406 (1988) (holding that
application of state law is preempted by § 301 of National Labor Relations Act of 1947 only if
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Model Act.'
D. The Waiver Provision
One of the provisions of the Act likely to spark significant contro-
versy is section 4(c), under which an employee may completely waive
by written agreement the requirement of good cause for termination
of her employment. 1  In exchange, the employer must agree to
provide the employee upon discharge for any reason other than
willful misconduct, with severance pay equal to at least one month's
pay for each year of employment.) 2 Such a contractual agreement
constitutes an express waiver by both the employer and the employee
of the right to a civil trial to resolve the termination dispute or the
entitlement to severance pay."3 Under the statute, the mere
existence of such an agreement constitutes a stipulation that such
disputes will be subject to the procedures and remedies of the
Act. 4  Such agreements must, of course, be entered into and
performed in good faith. °5 The drafters of the Act did not intend
for the waiver provision to apply to "contracts of adhesion."30 6 They
anticipated that the use of the waiver agreement would most likely be
limited to management employees, key professionals, and others not
likely to be laid off. 7
E. Procedure
The Act borrows the short 180-day statute of limitations used in title
VIF'" and many state statutes.3 09  The statute is tolled, however,
such application requires interpretation of collective bargaining agreement).
300. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 2 cmts. d, e.
301. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 4(c).
302. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 4(c). The Act limits severance
pay to 30 months' pay. Id. The basis for determining the proper amount an employer must pay
under this scheme is the rate at which the employee is being paid immediately prior to
termination. Id.
303. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 4(c).
304. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 4(c).
305. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 4(g) (noting that agreement
"imposes a duty of good faith in its formation, performance and enforcement").
306. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 4 cmL (stating that intent
of § 4 is "not to allow.., contracts of adhesion to be used to waive or otherwise circumvent
employees' rights under the Act").
307. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 4 cmL c (noting that use of
waiver agreement was, "as a practical matter, likely to be confined to ... persons not subject to
periodic layoff" because employer would otherwise incur risk that employee laid off for more
than two months would be apt to consider layoff as termination making employee eligible for
severance pay).
308. Compare MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT supra note 7, § 5(a) (requiring
terminated employee to file complaint and demand arbitration within 180 days after effective
date of termination) wvith 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (providing that "charge... shall be filed within
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while an employee pursues internal remedies.31° Exhaustion of
internal grievances is not a prerequisite for asserting a claim under
the Act.31
Arbitration is the preferred forum for resolving claims under the
Act.312 The drafters recognized that by drawing on over fifty years
of labor arbitration experience, a body of law and breadth of
experience can be applied to employment termination cases that
would not necessarily be available to courts.313 Nevertheless, the Act
does provide an alternative scheme in which a state agency or a state
court may hear cases arising under the Act.
3 14
As a matter of principle, the Act states a preference for state
funding as the method of financing enforcement.315 In recognition,
however, of the financial pressures many states face,316 the Act
provides an optional provision under which states would be permitted
to charge a filing fee.317 States could therefore elect to have the
parties bear a substantial part of the cost themselves. 8
one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred").
309. See, e.g., Georgia Fair Employment Practice Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-36 (Michie
1990) (providing that complaints by individuals "claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful
practice" are barred unless filed within 180 days of occurrence of such alleged unlawful
practice); Indiana Civil Rights Act, IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-3(0) (Bums Supp. 1993) (stating
that complaints concerning alleged discriminatory employment practices are not valid unless
filed within 180 days after occurrence).
310. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 5(a).
311. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supmra note 7, § 5(a).
312. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 6.
313. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, prefatory note (anticipating
that proceedings employing professional arbitrators will be "more expert" than those employing
courts andjuries); see also Summers, supra note 72, at 499 (explaining that statutory protections
against unjust terminations are "completely overshadowed by the body of law created by
arbitration under collective agreements" and further noting that arbitration has already
developed efficient procedures, has determined standards for just cause and for reviewing
penalties, and provided employees with effective remedies for unjust terminations).
314. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, prefatory note (recognizing
that Act gives states "several alternatives" and that enforcement procedures may vary among
states); id. app. Alternative A (providing for enforcement by state department, commission, or
service); id. app. Alternative B (providing forjudicial remedies).
315. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 5(e) cmL (stating opinion
that right not to be discharged without good cause is public right best financed by public
treasury).
316. SeeMODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 5 (e) (explaining that periods
of "financial stringency" may cause states to seek alternative funding to avoid assuming full
responsibility for cost of new administrative procedure).
317. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 5(e).
318. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 5(e) cmL The Act suggests
that if costs are charged to the parties, the statute might implement a cap on the employee's
contribution equal to one or two weeks' pretermination pay. Id Alternatively, a state could
impose a special "employment termination tax" on businesses covered by the AcL Id. The tax
would be imposed like an unemployment insurance tax, based on the experience rating of the
employer's claims history. Id.
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The Act allows parties to appeal arbitration decisions to a court of
general jurisdiction in thejurisdiction where the termination occurred
or where the employee resides.31 9 A court may vacate or modify an
arbitrator's award only if it finds that: (1) the award was procured by
"corruption, fraud, or other improper means"; (2) there was "evident
partiality" on the part of the arbitrator, or other misconduct that
prejudiced the rights of a party; (3) the arbitrator exceeded her
powers; (4) the arbitrator committed a "prejudicial error of law"; or
(5) "some other ground exists" for setting aside the award under the
Uniform Arbitration Act or an equivalent state arbitration statute
320exists.
The scope ofjudicial review under the Act may be greater than that
allowed in federal labor cases.32 1 Generally, a labor arbitrator is not
bound by the law. 22 Her sole task is to interpret the agree-
ment.3 23 A court may not set aside an arbitrator's award, even
where the results seem egregious, unless it finds that the award fails
to "draw its essence" from the contrac3 24 and concludes that no
reasonable person could reach the arbitrator's decision in interpreting
the particular contract at issue.32 In contrast, under the Act, a
It is estimated that the total cost of arbitration in a wrongful termination case would be about
$15,000. Todd H. Girshon, Wrongful Discharge Reform in the United States: International and
Domestic Perspectives on the Model Employment Termination Ac 6 EMORY INT'L L.Rt 635, 648 (1992).
319. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 8(a).
320. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 8(c).
321. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 8(c) (4) cmt. Under § 301
of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartdey) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988), federal courts
have jurisdiction to review arbitration awards. The scope of review, however, is quite limited.
See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987) (stating that in cases
involving collective bargaining agreements, "courts play only a limited role when asked to review
the decision of an arbitrator"); see also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (stating that lower court's refusal to review arbitration award on its merits
was "proper approach" in accord with federal policy). Under § 301, state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with federal courts, Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962),
but they must apply federal law. Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouseman & Helpers
of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962).
322. See generally ELKOuRI & ELKOURI, supra note 266, at 366-77 (discussing broad powers of
arbitrators to decide questions of substantive law, but noting that courts will generally not
enforce awards clearly illegal or against public policy).
323. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53, 56 (1974) (stating that
arbitrator's "source of authority is the collective bargaining agreement" and identifying duty as
being "to effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the requirements of enacted
legislation").
324. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,597 (1960).
325. See Enterprise Wheel 363 U.S. at 597 (clarifying that mere ambiguity in opinion
accompanying award, which suggests that arbitrator may have exceeded his power, is not
sufficient to set aside award). An example of the freedom enjoyed by arbitrators is shown in
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987). One of Misco's plant rules
provided that possession or use of controlled substances on company property was grounds for
discharge. Id. at 31. In apparent accord with this rule, an employee was discharged after being
caught by police while sitting in the back seat of someone else's car in Misco's parking lot "with
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court may set aside an arbitrator's award on the ground that the
arbitrator "committed a prejudicial error of law."326  One rationale
supporting this expanded scope of review is that, although arbitration
in the traditional labor relations context is voluntary and completely
a creature of contract, 2 arbitration under the Act is mandato-
ry.121 Moreover, where individual statutory rights are at issue, as
they are under the Act, less deference is given to arbitration awards
and courts have greater authority to interpret the law on review.
31
E Remedies
The damages remedies under the Act are patterned after those
available under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'" Under
marijuana smoke in the air and a lighted marijuana cigarette in the front seat ashtray." Id. at
33. The arbitrator ordered the reinstatement of the employee with back pay and full seniority,
concluding that the marijuana cigarette incident was insufficient evidence to establish that the
employee had used or possessed marijuana on company property. Id. at 34. The arbitrator
refused to allow the admission of evidence of the discovery of the marijuana gleanings in the
employee's car because Misco was not aware of gleanings at the time of the employee's
discharge. Id.
Misco appealed the decision to federal district court, where the arbitrator's award was vacated
on the grounds that reinstating the employee would violate public policy against operating
dangerous machinery while under the influence of drugs. Id. at 34-35. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739, 743 (5th Cir. 1985),
rev'd, 484 U.S. 29 (1987). The Supreme Court, however, reversed, determining that the
appellate court's formulation of policy was arrived at based on "general considerations of public
interest," and not by reference to law or precedent. Misco, 484 U.S. at 44. The Court was also
unwilling to set aside the award because the arbitrator could reasonably have concluded, under
all the circumstances, that the employer did not have just cause for discharge. See id. at 44-45
(noting that even if court of appeals' policy formulation was correct, there was no showing that
reinstatement would violate that policy because presence of marijuana gleanings in employee's
car did not prove that he had operated machinery while using drug).
326. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 8(c) (4).
327. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)
(finding arbitration "matter of contract" to which parties who have not so agreed cannot be
required to submit).
328. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 8(c) (4) cmt. (stating that Act
"imposes" arbitration as enforcement method on parties).
329. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 8(c) (4) cmL; cf. Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974) (holding that employee's right to bring suit
under title VII is not foreclosed by previous arbitral award); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740-44 (1981) (holding that petitioner's individual rights under Fair
Labor Standards Act were independent of contractual rights required for vindication under
arbitration, and that "arbitral procedures are less protective of individual statutory rights than
judicial procedures").
330. Prior to the 1991 amendment, plaintiffs in title VII actions could not recover damages.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). Remedies were limited to equitable remedies, including
reinstatement, back pay, and in some cases, front pay. Id.; see PERRTrr, supra note 101, at 98
(stating that many circuits now permit awards of front pay as remedy under title VII "in
appropriate cases"). In addition to title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 also amended the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 to allow limited damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. IV
1992).
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the Model Act, an employee forfeits all rights to recover traditional
tort or contract damages, as well as the right to recover punitive
damages."3 ' The preferred remedy under the Act is reinstate-
ment."3 2 In addition, an arbitrator may award full or partial back
pay, including reimbursement for lost fringe benefits.33  Where
reinstatement is not awarded, the Act authorizes a lump-sum
severance payment for a period not to exceed thirty-six months, plus
the value of lost fringe benefits."S The Act reduces awards of back
pay by interim earnings3 5 and reduces awards of severance pay by
likely earnings and benefits from employment elsewhere.3 6  In
calculating the award, the arbitrator must consider "equitable
considerations" such as the employee's length of service and the
reason for termination. 33' A prevailing plaintiff may also recover
attorney's fees under the Act.338 An employer, however, may also
recover attorney's fees if an arbitrator dismisses an employee's
complaint because it is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without founda-
tion.1339
331. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 7(d) (stating that arbitrators
"may not award damages for pain and suffering, emotional distress, defamation, fraud or other
injury under the common law" or punitive or compensatory damages).
332. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 7(b) (3).
333. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 7(b) (2).
334. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AT, supra note 7, § 7(b) (2).
335. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 7(b) (2).
336. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AT, supra note 7, § 7(b) (3).
337. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 7(b) (3).
338. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 7(b) (4).
339. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 7(e). The provision for
attorney's fees under the Act mirrors the standards for attorney's fees that have been applied
under title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988); See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AT, supra
note 7, §§ 7(b) (3), (c) (2), (e), & (f) cmL (stating that Act's language "deliberately tracks
language of Title VII and of Supreme Court cases interpreting Title VII"); see also Christianburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978) (concluding that, under title VII, prevailing
defendant may be awarded attorney's fees only if plaintiff's claim is "frivolous, unreasonable or
groundless," or if plaintiff continued litigation after claim had become so); Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975) (noting that public interest in bringing equitable actions to
eradicate discriminatory employment practices could be vindicated by awarding attorney's fees
to plaintiffs in all but special circumstances). The commissioners have suggested that when
calculating reasonable fees under the Act, tribunals look to "the prevailing market rate," a
measure commonly used in federal cases that include requests for attorney's fees under the Civil
Rights Attorneys Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). MODEL EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 7(b) (3) cmL Under the prevailing market rate approach, in
cases of small monetary claims, attorney's fees can exceed the amount of the plaintiff's recovery.
See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580 (1986) (finding no evidence that Congress
intended to require that attorney's fees in civil rights cases be proportionate to plaintiffs'
recoveries of damages); cf. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984) (finding that under 42
U.S.C. § 1988, "reasonable fees" are to be calculated according to prevailing market rates,
regardless of whether plaintiff is represented by private counsel); Hensleyv. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 434 (1983) (indicating that formula for determining attorney's fees should be "reasonable
hours times reasonable rate," but that fee can also be adjusted upward or downward to reflect
other factors including "results obtained").
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IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE MODEL AcT
A well-drafted employment termination statute should do, at a
minimum, the following: (1) deter employers from wrongfully
discharging employees, (2) punish employers who wrongfully
discharge employees, (3) make whole employees who are wrongfully
terminated, (4) provide access to a tribunal for all employees who
have been wrongfully discharged, and (5) protect employers from
specious claims by employees who were terminated for good cause.
The Model Act accomplishes the last two goals. The arbitration
system proposed under the Act would generally be accessible to all
employees.3" In addition, the Model Act provides employers some
protection against specious employee lawsuits by allowing employers
to recover attorneys' fees in such cases341 and by placing the burden
of proof on the employee .1 2 Moreover, by severely limiting recov-
ery by wrongfully discharged employees, the Model Act gives
employers significant protection against both meritless lawsuits and
extraordinarily large recoveries by successful plaintiffs. 43
The Model Act falls far short, however, of meeting the first three
goals. The remedies contained in the Act do not allow sufficient
economic recovery to punish or deter employers or make aggrieved
employees whole. In many cases, the limitations imposed on a
successful employee-plaintiff by the Act will result in a recovery far
smaller than the actual pecuniary loss experienced by the aggrieved
employee. 344 Because of the limitations the Act places on an
employee-plaintiff's recovery, and its absolute prohibition against the
recovery of compensatory or punitive damages, the Act provides no
effective deterrent to employers. In fact, an employer may see the
claims of such employees as nothing more than minor inconvenienc-
340. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 5(a) (indicating that any
terminated employee may file complaint and demand for arbitration under Act).
341. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AGr, supra note 7, § 7(e) (stating that arbitrator
who finds employee's complaint to be "frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation" may
award "reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the prevailing employer").
342. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 6(e); see also supra notes 275-
76 and accompanying text (explaining that employee bears burden of proving lack of good
cause for termination or breach of agreement for severance pay under § 4(c)).
343. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 7(d) (disallowing recovery
of compensatory and punitive damages); see also supra note 331 and accompanying text (listing
common-law injuries for which arbitrators are precluded from awarding damages).
344. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACr, supra note 7, § 7(b) (giving arbitrator
discretion to award reinstatement, full or partial back pay, a lump sum severance payment if
reinstatement is not awarded, or attorney's fees, or a combination of remedies). An award of
only one of the permissible remedies will obviously result in some amount of unreimbursed loss
to the employee.
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es, a cost of doing business. The Act also invites abuse by allowing
employers to require employees to waive the right to just-cause
protection against wrongful discharge in exchange for a modest
severance payment,3 4- and by giving employers unfettered freedom
to set standards ofjob performance.34
6
As a result of these deficiencies in the Act, employees in many
states are better off under the current common law than they would
be under the new statute. Many elements of the Model Act are
commendable and desirable. Adopting the good cause standard3 47
and anticipating application of the established jurisprudence of labor
arbitration 48 is an excellent idea. Seeking to reduce the complexity
and cost of litigation by encouraging arbitration4 9 is another
positive step. Unfortunately, the Act's giant leap forward in providing
these substantive standards is undermined by the inclusion of
exceptions to the good cause standard, by the remedy portions of the
statute, and by its waiver provision.
A. The Good Cause Standard
Adoption of the good cause standard was a prudent decision.
Arbitration has been the preferred method of resolving disputes
under collective bargaining agreements between unions and employ-
ers for more than fifty years.50 Discipline cases, which include
discharge cases, are the most frequently arbitrated cases under
collective bargaining agreements, 35' and they are generally governed
345. See supra notes 301-07 and accompanying text (discussing Model Act's waiver provision).
346. See supra notes 281-85 and accompanying text (explaining that employer is free to select
and change standards ofjob performance in accordance with requirements of particular industry
as long as decisions are made in good faith). Under the § 4 waiver provisions, employers and
employees can also agree that failure to meet such employer specified performance standards
constitutes "good cause." MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 4(b).
347. See supra notes 258-66 and accompanying text (defining parameters of Act's good cause
standard).
348. See supra note 313 and accompanying text (discussing Act's preference for arbitration
because of expertise that labor arbitrators have previously developed).
349. See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text (reviewing Act's preference for
arbitration). Although the author does not favor the arbitration remedy as currentiy drafted,
see infra notes 376-423 and accompanying text, this Article does favor encouraging and providing
a system that is equally accessible to lower level, lower paid employees, as well as to highly paid
middle- and upper-management employees.
350. See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURU, supra note 266, at 2-7 (summarizing historical
development of labor arbitration in America in association with development of collective
bargaining from its beginnings in late 19th century through its "rapid advance" since World War
II).
351. See Summers, supra note 72, at 507 (stating that discipline cases are "by far the largest
category of cases brought to arbitration").
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by a just cause standard.35 Consequently, the Model Act's standard
can draw on over half a century of arbitral experience. Arbitrators
have already considered everything from the level of proof to be
required in such cases353 to the kind of nonwork activity that should
justify a discharge.354 The principles are now well enough estab-
lished that even an inexperienced trier of fact would be well guided
in reaching a decision.
In addition, under the good-cause standard of the Model Act, the
arbitrator is called upon to determine whether the discharge was
justified under the totality of the circumstances.55  Thus, if an
employee were discharged for tardiness, the arbitrator would consider
not only whether the employer had a rule against tardiness and
whether the employee violated the rule, but also whether the
employee knew of the rule, whether it was regularly enforced, and
whether the employee had been warned in the past about tardiness,
as well as similar equitable factors. 56
1. Performance standards
The shortcomings in the good cause standard of the Model Act are
twofold. First, the Model Act gives an employer carte blanche in setting
performance standards.3 7 An employer could, for example, signifi-
cantly increase the speed of an assembly line or set unrealistic sales
targets with impunity. Any employee who failed to meet the new
standards could be terminated, regardless of longevity and compe-
tence. In the traditional union setting, such changes in standards
would generally be subject to collective bargaining with the un-
352. See GOULD, supra note 8, at 63 (noting that 95% of collective bargaining agreements
protected employees from discharge withoutjust cause); see also Burlington N.RR v. Individual
Grievant, 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 144, 147 (1993) (referring to customaryjust cause standard
in collective bargaining agreements).
353. See ELKOURI & ELKOUR, supra note 266, at 324-25 (discussing application of "doctrine
of burden of proof" in arbitration).
354. See ELKOU=I & ELKOURi, supra note 266, at 656-58 (reviewing employers' rights to
discharge employees for conduct outside work facility).
355. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AGr, supra note 7, § 1(4) cmt. (listing relevant
factors that may be taken into account in determining good cause); see also supra notes 260-66
and accompanying text (discussing factors that may be taken into consideration in totality of
circumstances test).
356. See generally ELKOUPtI & ELKOURI, supra note 266, at 670-88 (identifying and considering
most prominent factors relevant in reviewing or evaluating penalties assessed for employee
misconduct).
357. See supra notes 281-85 and accompanying text (discussing broad latitude employers have
in setting job performance standards).
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ion."'8 The nonunion setting governed by the Model Act, however,
provides no such organizational mechanism to protect employees
from the imposition of arbitrary or unreasonable standards. The
opportunity for employer abuse in the nonunion context is quite real.
To counteract these opportunities for abuse, the Model Act should
stand silent on the issue of modification of performance standards.
If an employer modified its standards rationally and in good faith,
and an employee failed to meet them, an arbitrator might well find
a discharge justified. If the employer had manipulated the standards
or otherwise acted in bad faith, however, the arbitrator could consider
that fact as well. By expressly addressing the issue as it does, the
Model Act invites abuse and consequent litigation.
2. The waiver provision
A second, and potentially greater, shortcoming of the good-cause
standard is the waiver provision. Under the Act, an employer and an
employee may enter into a written agreement to waive the good-cause
standard, so long as the employer agrees to pay the discharged
employee severance pay equal to one month's pay for each year of
service, up to a maximum of thirty months' pay. 59 As previously
discussed, the Act also allows employers and employees to contractual-
ly define good cause to include the employee's failure to meet
"specified business-related standards of performance" or the
employee's "commission or omission of specified business-related
acts."3" In addition, the good cause requirement does not apply to
the termination of an employee at the expiration of an express oral
or written agreement "of employment for a specified duration related
to the completion of a specified task, project, undertaking, or
assignment."36' Notwithstanding contrary assertions in the com-
ments to the Act, 62 these provisions are an open invitation to
358. Under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988), employers are
required to bargain with the union regarding "wages, hours, terms and conditions of
employment." Id. § 158(d). Matters that fall within these "mandatory" bargaining subjects
include seniority, United States Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112 (1951), fringe benefits, 1 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
865-82 (Patrick Hardin et a. eds., 3d ed. 1992), and grievance and arbitration procedures, id.
at 885. An employer who makes unilateral changes in a mandatory subject violates section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5).
359. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, §4(c); see also supra text
accompanying notes 301-07 (discussing waiver provisions).
360. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 4(b).
361. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 4(d).
362. MODELEMPLOYMENTTERMINATIONACT, supranote 7, § 4(c) cmL (stating drafters' belief
that, for practical reasons, waiver agreements are likely to be used only with management or key
employees).
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employers to enter into convenient "contracts of adhesion"363 with
all employees.
The possibility that an employer may pressure an employee to waive
her legal rights is not far-fetched. For example, it was enough of a
problem for older employees that Congress amended the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act' to provide employees with
some protection against coerced waiver of their statutory rights.31
Under this amendment, an employer who seeks to obtain a waiver of
an employee's rights to sue in the event of discharge must, among
other things, give the employee twenty-one days in which to seek the
advice of counsel."s
The problem with the waiver requirement is aptly illustrated by the
facts of a case currently being litigated in federal court in Ohio.8 7
The employee, Jason Miller, began working for the defendant
employer (the company) in 1961, at the age of nineteen. He began
as an hourly employee in the bargaining unit represented by a major
international union. In 1970, the company promoted Miller to a
managerial position outside the bargaining unit. He held various
managerial positions within the plant until 1992. In late 1992, Miller
was summoned to the office of the company's Manager of Human
Resources and offered the choice of either taking early retirement by
signing and accepting a separation agreement or being terminated
immediately. The company never provided any clear explanation for
the termination."i
363. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr, supra note 7, § 4 cmL (stating that circumvent-
ing rights of employees is not intent of § 4, but also implicitly admitting possibility that
severance pay agreements could be considered "contracts of adhesion"); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "adhesion contract" as contract offered in circumstances
in which one party lacks bargaining power and under conditions such that that party cannot
obtain desired result without acquiescing to other party's terms).
364. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
365. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (Supp. IV 1992)
(providing that individuals "may not waive any right or claim ... unless the waiver is knowing
and voluntary").
366. Id. § 626(f) (1) (E).
367. This case is being litigated by the author's close friend, who practices in Ohio. The case
is still in the discovery stage. Although the matter is now one of public record, in the interest
of preserving some modicum of privacy for both the plaintiff and the defendants, the names of
the litigants have been changed. Case materials are on file with the U.S. Federal District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio.
368. Mr. Miller had in the past experienced some personality conflicts with the Manager of
Human Resources, who had allegedly expressed his desire to see Miller discharged. Miller,
however, had received satisfactory performance reviews overall. In addition, within the 12
months preceding his discharge, the company had made Miller Acting Plant Manager for a
period of time when the Superintendent of the plant was away.
Following Miller's termination, and after six months of investigative work by both Miller and
his attorney, Miller asserted, inter alia, the following tort, contract, and statutory claims: (1)
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The proposed agreement provided Miller with six months'
severance pay and medical, dental, and prescription drug insurance
coverage. Under its terms, Miller would be required to retire formally
when his severance pay expired.369 If Miller had accepted the
employer's offer, however, he would have been required to waive his
right to pursue statutory and common-law claims against the company.
70
Instead of accepting the forced resignation and retirement,
71
promissory estoppel, based on company promises that Miller could return to the bargaining unit
at any time if he was unsuccessful in his supervisory position and could work until retirement;
(2) breach of contract, based on company employment manuals and other documents that
promised employees that the company would provide continuous employment, consistent with
business conditions, and that employees would be treated fairly; and (3) age discrimination
(state and federal claims), based on the company's alleged practice of coercing senior, higher
paid employees to retire early.
369. The Agreement provided that "[Miller] shall, at the appropriate time, and at his
request, as determined by the pension plan and all applicable laws, make application for and
execute all documents necessary for participation in the pension plan pursuant to the pension
plan's provisions to become effective May 1, 1993."
370. In this respect, the Agreement provided:
In consideration for the benefits and payments described herein, [Miller] hereby
releases and forever discharges the Company . . . and the officers, shareholders,
directors, employees, representatives, and agents of the foregoing, from all liability,
claims and demands, actions and causes of actions, damages, costs, payments and
expenses of every kind, nature or description, that [Miller] may have based on his
employment with the Company or the termination of that employment. [Miller]
understands and agrees that he is releasing any and all claims in tort or in contract
(express or implied) arising from any alleged violation by the Company of any federal,
state or local statutes, ordinances or common laws, including, but not limited to, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. [s]ections 621 to 634, and Ohio Civil
Rights laws, Ohio Revised Code Title 41, [slections 4112.01 to 4112.99 and 4101, et.
seq. This Separation Agreement and Release do not constitute a waiver of any rights
or claims that may arise after the date when [Miller] signs this document
The Agreement did, as required by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §
626(f) (1) (E) (Supp. IV 1992), advise Miller to consult with an attorney, and gave him the
statutorily required 21 days to do so. It also, however, included the following provisions:
X. [Miller] agrees to indemnify and hold the Company harmless from and against any
and all liability including, but not limited to, any and all losses, costs, damages,
expenses or attorney's fees arising out of any breach of this Agreement by [Miller].
In the event of any breach of this Agreement by [Miller], [Miller] agrees to return to
the Company immediately all payments made to him and all other costs incurred
under this Agreement for [Miller's] benefit.
XI. The parties agree that the terms of this Agreement shall be confidential and shall
not be discussed with or revealed to, any persons, and in no event shall said Agreement
or its terms be published or publicized in any manner whatsoever. [Miller] further
agrees that, in the event that [Miller] and or his agents or attorneys reveal to any
person or entity or in any manner whatsoever cause any of the terms of this Agreement
to be published or publicized, except as required by law, the company shall be entitled
to legal and or equitable relief and damages in an amount to be determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction.
XII. [Miller] hereby waives any and all claims to future employment or reinstatement
by the Company or any person or entity released hereby and any and all claims to
benefits based in whole or in part on his prior employment by the Company, other
than those benefits described herein.
371. The Agreement suggested in its recitals that the document represented a negotiated
understanding-
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Miller elected to undertake the risk of litigation. His motivation was
twofold. First, at the time of his termination, Miller was only fifty
years old. He enjoyed his work immensely and did not intend to
retire for at least another twenty years. Second, although the law
purports to protect employees against age discrimination, the reality
is that age discrimination is common throughout the labor mar-
ket.-" 2 Few employers would have hired Miller to do the same kind
of supervisory work at the same salary that he earned at the company.
Like many of his contemporaries, Miller does not have a college
degree, and he would be competing in a recessionary economy
against younger, less expensive employees who did have college
degrees.
Prior to his termination, Miller was earning, with overtime, between
$65,000 and $85,000 annually. He anticipated working at least until
age seventy. In the current market, Miller is likely to earn, at most,
$38,000 to $47,000 per year, if he is willing to relocate. If he desires
to stay in Ohio, where he has lived all his life, his earning potential
drops below $30,000 per year. His estimated financial loss, reduced
to present value, is in excess of $500,000. The severance package
offered by the employer was worth perhaps $40,000. In addition,
there is no way to quantify Miller's loss of self-esteem and personal
enjoyment, nor to fully reimburse him for such a loss.
If employers reserve the right to treat any employee they choose as
an at-will employee, subject only to a statutory requirement to provide
severance pay,371 there will continue to be thousands of Jason
Millers nationwide. Under the Model Act, if Miller had signed a
waiver agreement, he would have received a full thirty months' pay,
one for each year of service. 74 This lump sum severance payment
would have been at his "rate of pay in effect immediately before the
termination." 75 The total payment to Miller would have been
approximately $125,000. Miller's base rate for determining the
severance payment, however, would not reflect the significant
overtime he has historically worked. Nor would the total payment
WHEREAS, the parties desire to terminate [Miller's] employment with the Company
on October 20, 1992 on terms acceptable to [Miller] and the Company; and
WHEREAS, the parties have negotiated this written Agreement in order to effectuate
such terms and to resolve any and all matters in dispute between them;
In fact, the Agreement was a "take it or leave it" proposal.
372. See Sixel, supra note 204, at C1 (proffering experts' opinions that employers very often
hire, promote, or fire based on age of employees, despite illegality of such practices).
373. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 4(c).
374. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 4(c).
375. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 4(c).
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compensate Miller for foregone opportunities to move to another
employer when he was younger, for most of the years beyond age fifty
during which he had expected to continue productive employment,
for the negative impact on his pension, or for numerous other factors.
The Model Act's waiver provision would allow an employer to
require every employee to sign such an agreement at the commence-
ment of his employment, so long as the requisite statutory severance
pay was promised. An employee like Miller who alleges that he was
wrongfully terminated would have no recourse under state law.
Unless there was evidence of race, sex, age, or other discrimination
prohibited by federal statute, the employee would be without any
remedy.
B. The Statutory Procedure
The Model Act favors arbitration as the forum for resolving
employment termination disputes. 76  In favoring arbitration, the
drafters of the Act are in agreement with numerous commentators
who have argued that arbitration is the best way to resolve wrongful
discharge disputes. 7  This Article, however, proposes a different
approach. Instead of arbitration, this Article urges that the procedure
for seeking remedies be patterned after title VII, with some modifica-
tions.
Arbitration is a fundamental tenet of labor policy and jurisprudence
in the United States. Both Congress378 and the Supreme Court
79
have affirmed the importance of arbitration in resolving labor
disputes time and again. The Court has viewed arbitration as a forum
376. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Aar, supra note 7, at 68, prefatory note
(indicating that arbitration is "preferred method of enforcement... [which] should provide
... speedier, more informal, more expert and less expensive proceedings").
377. See, eg., Gould, supra note 100, at 43 (stating that although arbitration has some
drawbacks, it is very useful model); Summers, supra note 72, at 521 (asserting that "[lI]egal
protection against unjust dismissal can best be built upon the standards and procedure of our
existing arbitration system").
378. See generally PERRrITr, supra note 101, at 203-06 (enumerating 1888 Arbitration Act, 25
Stat. 501 (1888), 1920 Transportation Act, ch. 91, 41 StaL 456 (1920), Railway Labor Act of
1926, ch. 347, 44 Star. 577 (1926) and § 301 of Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch.
120, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) as statutes in which Congress recognized importance of arbitration in
resolving grievance disputes.
379. See, e.g., Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,398 U.S. 235, 242-43 (1970)
(emphasizing importance of arbitration as "instrument of federal policy for resolving disputes
between labor and management"); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (noting that "federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through
the collective bargaining agreement" and "[a] major factor in achieving industrial peace is the
inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement");
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (stating that
federal policy encourages settlement of labor disputes through arbitration).
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desirable primarily to unions, assuming that the arbitration clause is
for the union the quid pro quo for the no-strike clause sought by the
employer."' 0 One of the reasons for relying so heavily on arbitrators
is that they are viewed as understanding the "common law.., of..
* the shop"381 and the culture that is inherent to each industry.3 2
In the nearly sixty years since the NLRA 8 3 gave employees a
federally protected right to organize and bargain collectively, 4
arbitration has become a way of life in the union setting. Approxi-
mately ninety-six percent of all collective bargaining agreements have
provisions for final and binding arbitration of most disputes, including
discharge.3 85 Most of those agreements establish a standard of 'Just
cause" for discharge.8 6 So strong is the tradition of just cause in
arbitral jurisprudence that many arbitrators have inferred the
existence of ajust-cause standard in agreements that did not expressly
state such a standard.387
380. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957) (stating that
agreement to arbitrate is "plainly ... the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike"). This
presumption is so strong that if an agreement contains an arbitration clause, the court will infer
the existence of a no-strike clause. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105-06
(1962). The author disagrees with this premise: the presence of an arbitration clause merely
indicates that both parties favor arbitration as an expedient, relatively inexpensive means of
resolving the dozens of disputes that regularly arise in the workplace.
381. See Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581-82 (stating that arbitrators are usually chosen because
parties trust their judgment in considering factors peculiar to industry but not expressed in
contract as criteria for judgment).
382. See Enterprise Wheel & Car, 363 U.S. at 596 n.2 (describing development of particular
industries as "miniature societies") (citing Charles R. Walker, Life in the Automatic Factory, HARV.
Bus. REv.,Jan./Feb., 1958, at 111, 117.
383. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988). The original version of the National Labor Relations Act
was known as the Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
384. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) (giving employees "right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives ... and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining").
385. SeeJack Stieber, Termination of Employment in the United States, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 327, 330-
31 (1982) (noting that arbitration procedures most commonly are 2-, 3-, or 4-step procedures
that result in binding arbitral awards).
386. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 266, at 652 (discussing requirements for discipline
and discharge that are contained in most collective bargaining agreements). In one survey
conducted in 1975, 79% of collective bargaining agreements contained general statements that
employees could be discharged for "cause" or "just cause." Summers, supra note 72, at 499
n.104. Many arbitrators, however, will find an implicit "just cause" limitation in the agreement.
See ELOOuRI & Et.KOURI, supra note 266, at 652 (stating that "many arbitrators would imply just
cause limitation into any collective agreement7 because to do otherwise would "reduce to a
nullity the fundamental provision of a labor-management agreement the security of a worker
in his job"). William Gould, the recently confirmed chairman of the National Labor Relations
Board, estimates that 95% of all agreements protect employees against discharge without just
cause. GouLD, supra note 8, at 63.
387. See Cameron Iron Works, 25 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 295, 301 (1955) (stating that "just
cause' basis for consideration of disciplinary action is, absent a clear proviso to the contrary,
implied in modern collective bargaining agreement"); see also United Food & Commercial
Workers Int'l v. Gold Star Sausage, 487 F. Supp. 596, 600 (D. Colo. 1980) (upholding arbitrator's
910
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Discharge is viewed as the "capital punishment" of the shop."~
In deciding a discharge case, the arbitrator seeks to dispense justice
and mercy by weighing numerous mitigating factors in making her
decision to uphold or overturn the discharge.389 It is not uncom-
mon for arbitrators to "split the baby in half" by reinstating the
discharged employee to his former job while denying him back pay
or allowing only partial back pay.3l
This established system has worked quite well chiefly because it
exists in a two-party environment. Labor arbitration is simply a
proceeding between the union and the employer, even in discharge
or individual rights cases.391 The union pays the costs of the
proceeding and represents the employee at the hearing.392 If the
union retains counsel, the union pays counsel fees. 93 The process-
ing of grievances is so integrated into the totality of the labor-manage-
ment relationship that it is not uncommon for the union and the
employer to resolve at the bargaining table employee grievances,
which would otherwise go to arbitration. 9 4
Although this comprehensive dispute resolution system may work
well in the traditional labor-management environment, where
arbitration is a part of the unionized industrial culture, 95 it is not
appropriate for wholesale adaptation in the arena of wrongful
discharge. 96 Many labor arbitrators, who are chosen in part for
inference of presence of just cause provision in agreement with no clear restrictions to
contrary); Shearson v. Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 653 F.2d 310, 312 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating
that courts have "repeatedly held" that agreements to arbitrate employee discharge disputes
"impl[y] requirement that discharges be only for just cause").
388. Universal Frozen Foods, 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 24, 26 (1992); University of
Pennsylvania, 99 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 352, 360 (1992).
389. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 266, at 666-67 (discussing function of arbitrator in
reviewing discharge).
390. See generally ELKOtPRI & ELKOURI, supra note 266, at 688-91 (discussing arbitral remedies
in discharge cases).
391. See ELKOURI & ELKOuU~, supra note 266, at 6-9 (discussing arbitration setting).
392. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 266, at 19 (noting costs associated with arbitration
proceeding). It is common for the employer and the union to split the cost of the arbitration
proceeding equally. Id.
393. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 266, at 20 (explaining who typically pays counsel fees
in arbitration proceedings). Many unions, particularly smaller, less affluent locals, use staff
representatives from the national union or other nonlawyers to handle the arbitration. Id. at
241-42. Employers, on the other hand, seem to use lawyers more frequently. Id. at 242.
394. See Mark Berger, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Practices, Policies, and
Sanctions, 10 HoFSa.A LAB. LJ. 245, 246 (explaining utility of arbitration in labor culture).
395. See Gould, supra note 100, at 418 (reviewing fit between arbitration and labor-
management dispute resolution).
396. As Professor Gould has noted, "Arbitration in the organized sector is voluntarily
bargained for and shaped to the peculiar needs of the labor-management relationship involved.
This can never be true of a system imposed by law." Gould, supra note 100, at 418.
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their expert knowledge of the world of industry, are not lawyers. 97
Consequently, arbitration proceedings can vary widely in terms of the
formality of the hearings,"8 whether or not rules of evidence
apply,' 9 and how much weight the arbitrator accords prece-
dent.' In fact, arbitrators are not obligated to follow the law
expressly. 1  A reviewing tribunal will generally uphold an
arbitrator's decision, so long as it draws "its essence" from the
collective bargaining agreement.4 2 In addition, arbitrators generally
do not award damages, nor do they tend to exercise broad equitable
powers other than ordering reinstatement of a discharged employ-
ee.
403
The act of wrongfully terminating an employee for an arbitrary,
capricious, or even morally objectionable reason is no different in
effect from discharging an employee because of age, sex, race,
handicap, or any other discriminatory reason. In drafting the Model
Act, the commissioners recognized these similarities and fashioned
certain parts of the Model Act after title VII.40 ' All of the federal
statutes prohibiting discrimination now follow a well-established
procedure in which a discharged employee must first file a charge
with the applicable state agency, if there is one.405 Thereafter, the
employee must file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC).406 If the EEOC finds evidence of discrim-
397. See Stephen L. Hayford, The Coming Third Era of Labor Arbitration, 48 ARB. J. 8, 78
(explaining that law experience is not precondition for arbitration appointment).
398. See Berger, supra note 394, at 254 (discussing often informal nature of arbitration
proceedings).
399. See ELKOURI & ELKOUIU, supra note 266, at 296 (explaining that individual arbitrators
are free to set evidentiary rules).
400. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 266, at 419-21 (stating that there is no clear doctrine
of stare decisis in labor arbitration).
401. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (stating
that courts do not judge legal error of arbitrator); Olin Corp., 268 N.L.RB. 573, 574 (1984)
(deferring to arbitration decision even when arbitrator's award is not "totally consistent with
Board precedent").
402. See supra notes 324-26 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances under which
court will set aside arbitrator's award).
403. See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 266, at 688-91 (outlining remedial powers
of arbitrators).
404. See supra notes 309, 330 and accompanying text (explaining how procedural and
damages sections of Model Act are modeled after title VII).
405. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1988); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1988); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12117
(Supp. IV 1992).
406. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12117. If there is a state agency,
charges must also be filed with the EEOC within 300 days after the discharge occurred. 42
U.S.C. § 200e-5(e); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12117. If there is no state agency with
jurisdiction, the charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(e);
29 U.S.C. § 626(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12117.
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ination, the agency will investigate the dismissed employee's charge
and then seek a conciliation agreement with the employer. 7
In contrast to the EEOC, many state agencies have the power to
adjudicate claims, subject to judicial review in state courts.0  A
decision by a state court on the matter, however, will bar any
additional action by the EEOC and will preclude the employee from
seeking redress in federal court.' Alternatively, the EEOC may
bring suit on the employee's behalf,410 or the employee may file suit
on her own.11  This procedure, which offers the aggrieved employ-
ee a choice between a government-funded administrative resolution
of her claim and litigation, is ideally suited for use in wrongful
discharge cases.
The Model Act has adopted state-funded arbitration as the
preferred method for resolving wrongful discharge claims.412  "For
states concerned about the possible extra expense of outside
arbitrators,"1' the Act also provides an alternative method, Alterna-
tive A,' 14 which utilizes hearing officers and is similar to the method
currently used by many states for discrimination cases.415 Addition
ally, for those "states concerned about possible constitutional
407. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12117; see PERRITr, supra note
101, at 96 (discussing conciliation as EEOC alternative). In practice, the EEOC often delays any
actual investigation until the state investigation is completed. PERRrIT, supra.
408. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1481 (1991) (describing enforcement procedures
for discrimination in employment); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-3 (1988) (discussing remedial
procedures of Civil Rights Division); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.04 (Anderson 1991)
(providing Ohio Civil Rights Commission with power to adjudicate claims subject to review by
state court).
409. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461, 476 (1982).
410. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12117. Generally, the EEOC
will only file suit in particularly egregious cases, or where there is evidence of a pattern or
practice of discrimination. SeeJohn A. Tisdale, Deterred Nonapplicants in Title Vii Class Actions:
Examining the Limits ofEqual Opportunity, 64 B.U. L. REV. 151, 158 (1984) (comparing level of
cause statutorily required before EEOC action with actual commission practice).
411. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12117. Under title VII, the
EEOC has 180 days to conduct its investigation before the employee may bring suit. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) (1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12117. If the agency finishes the investigation
and declines to take action, it will issue a "right-to-sue" letter to the employee. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f) (1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12117. The employee, however, has the right to
demand the right-to-sue letter at any time after the expiration of the 180 day period. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) (1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12117. The employee then has 90 days within
which to file suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12117. The title
VII action may be filed in either state or federal court. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly,
494 U.S. 820, 821 (1990) (concluding that states hold concurrent authority to adjudicate title
VII claims). See generally PERRITr, supra note 101, at 95-99 (describing briefly entire title VII
procedure).
412. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr, supra note 7, prefatory note.
413. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, prefatory note.
414. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, at app. (Alternative A).
415. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AT, supra note 7, prefatory note.
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problems concerning the right to jury trial, access to the courts,
etc.,"416 the Act provides yet another alternative, Alternative B,417
which leaves enforcement in the hands of civil courts. s
This Article proposes that given the many years of experience with
the title VII procedure, the Act should be modeled after title VII. An
aggrieved employee should have the option first to pursue a claim
entirely through the state administrative process, subject to judicial
review in state court.419 This procedure would reflect the consider-
ations encompassed by Alternative A under the Model Act.420  In
addition, or in the alternative, an employee should have the right to
bring a civil suit. Arbitration should only be available to the parties,
as an alternative to state administrative or civil proceedings, if it has
been chosen as an option by mutual agreement.421
The alternative this Article proposes, like Alternative A, utilizes
existing administrative machinery, reduces costs, and eliminates any
controversy over the constitutional right to a trial by jury in state
courts.422 By offering arbitration as an alternative, the proposed
statute would conform with traditional labor relations principles that
require arbitration only where agreed upon by the parties.42
C. The Toothless Tiger: Remedies Under the Model Act
Under the Model Act, the preferred remedy for wrongfully
discharged employees is reinstatement. 424 In addition, an arbitrator
may award back pay and reimbursement for lost fringe benefits.
42
Such awards, however, are reduced by the amount of compensation
earned by the discharged employee between the time of discharge
416. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, prefatory note.
417. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, at app. (Alternative B).
418. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, prefatory note.
419. See Blades, supra note 10, at 1433 (proposing that claims of abusive dismissal be heard
by civil rights or fair employment practices agencies rather than by courts andjuries). Although
not currently practiced under the title VII mechanism, states could charge parties who file a
claim a small filing fee in an effort to deter the most frivolous claims.
420. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, at app. (Alternative A).
421. The author, of course, prefers a federal statute. See infra notes 465-76 and accompany-
ing text (discussing need for federal statute). Such a statute would, like title VII, allow the
aggrieved employee to file a claim with both the EEOC and the appropriate state agency and/or
file a suit in state or federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).
422. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AT, supra note 7, prefatory note (detailing
benefits of Alternatives provided for in Model Act).
423. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 266, at 6-9 (discussing traditional use of arbitration
in labor setting).
424. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 7(b) (3) cmL
425. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 7(b) (2).
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and the date of the award.426 In lieu of reinstatement, the arbitra-
tor may award a lump-sum severance payment.4 7 The severance
payment, however, may not exceed a total of thirty-six months of pay,
and it must be reduced by the "likely earnings and benefits from
employment elsewhere."428 The arbitrator may also award attorney's
fees and costs. 4m  The arbitrator is expressly prohibited under the
Act from granting any other monetary award or equitable relief. °
It is this severely restrictive scheme for damages that makes the Act
truly a toothless tiger.
The experience of being wrongfully discharged from her employ-
ment can prove devastating to an employee. Under traditional tort
law, we readily compensate victims of legally recognized torts for
physical injuries and accompanying pain and discomfort. An
employee's wrongful termination can cause catastrophic emotional
upheaval that is just as traumatic as the pain and suffering or mental
distress suffered by an accident victim.43 The employee's dignity
and sense of self-worth are often undermined. The economic strain
caused by the employee's loss of wages compounds this emotional
trauma.432 The ramifications of wrongful discharge far exceed those
426. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 7(b) (2). An arbitrator may
award "full or partial backpay and reimbursement for lost fringe benefits, with interest, reduced
by interim earnings from employment elsewhere, benefits received, and amounts that could have
been received with reasonable diligence." Id.
427. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 7(b)(3).
428. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 7(b)(3). Section 7(b)(2)
provides:
[Ihf an employee is not reinstated, the arbitrator may award a lump-sum severance
payment at the employee's rate of pay in effect before the termination, for a period
not exceeding [36 months] after the date of the award, together with the value of
fringe benefits lost during that period, reduced by likely earnings and benefits from
employment elsewhere, and taking into account such equitable considerations as the
employee's length of service with the employer and reasons for the termination.
Id.
429. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 7(b)(4).
430. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, supra note 7, § 7(d). Section 7(d) provides:
An arbitrator may not make an award except as provided [herein]. The arbitrator may
not award damages for pain and suffering, emotional distress, defamation, fraud, or
other injury under the common law, punitive damages; compensatory damages; or any
other monetary award. In making a monetary award under this section, the arbitrator
shall reduce the award by the amount of any monetary award to the employee in
another forum for the same conduct of the employer. In making an award, the
arbitrator is subject to the rules of issue, fact, and judgment preclusion applicable in
courts of record in this State.
Id.
431. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (describing severe emotional trauma
associated with discharge).
432. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (detailing financial consequences of
discharge).
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of a host of other injuries for which we readily provide compensa-
tion.4" Yet under the Model Act, a wrongfully discharged employee
can recover nothing for the physical and/or psychological harm she
has suffered. 4 Her recovery is limited to little more than a few
dollars back pay. Under the Act, it is the victim of the employer's
wrong who bears the non-wage costs of the employer's act, not the
employer.435
The Act as presently written does not begin to make victims whole
for the injury inflicted by their employer, 6 nor does it provide any
deterrence against future wrongful conduct by the employer.3 On
the contrary, the Model Act turns wrongful termination suits into an
easily valuated cost of doing business. As a result, it may cause more
harm than good to many employees throughout the nation.
As originally adopted, title VII provided nothing more than the
"equitable" remedies of back pay and reinstatement.438 Like the
433. See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law Through Uniform
Legislation: The Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. REV. 291, 337 (1994) (discussing "make-
whole" remedy in defamation cases).
434. SeeMODEL EMpLoYMENT TEMNATION ACr, supra note 7, § 7(b) (2)k (detailing remedies
available under Model Act).
435. Cf H.R. REP. No. 40(I), 102d Cong. 1st Sess. 66 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
549, 604 ("'Who should bear the non-wage costs of intentional, illegal discrimination: the
perpetrator of the discrimination or the victim?' Under current Title VII law, it is the victim.").
436. See supra notes 424-30 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacy of damage
remedies under Model Act). Prior to the 1991 amendments, tide VII, like the Model Act,
limited recovery to back pay and reinstatement. See infra notes 438-54 and accompanying text
(reviewing changes to recovery made under 1991 amendments to title VII). In hearings on the
1991 amendments, the House Committee on Education and Labor heard the testimony of Carol
Zabkowicz. H.R. REP. No. 40 (I), supra note 435, at 67,1991 U.S.C.C.N. at 605. Ms. Zabkowicz
had been an employee of West Bend Co., where she suffered sexual harassment. Zabkowicz v.
West Bend Co., 584 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984), affid in part, rev'd in part on othergrounds,
789 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986). The harassment led to emotional and physical complications,
including vomiting, severe nausea, and other gastrointestinal disorders. Id. When she became
pregnant, her doctor advised her to take a medical leave of absence, which she did. Id.
Thereafter she sued for harassment under tide VII and won. Id. The federal court observed
that Ms. Zabkowicz had been the victim of "sustained, vicious, and brutal harassment [which
was] malevolent and outrageous." Id. Nevertheless, the court could award her only $2763 in
back pay for the 2-month absence from work during her pregnancy. Id. at 785. Ms. Zabkowicz's
testimony before the House Committee is compelling:
I have heard that Tide VII is supposed to make victims "whole" for the harm they have
suffered because of discrimination. Well, I was not "made whole." Not only did I have
to pay a lot of medical bills and suffer a great deal of medical harm because of the
harassment, but I was robbed of my dignity. Today, in 1990, several years after leaving
West Bend, I am finding the healing process is far from over. Title VII did not make
me "whole" for the harm I suffered.
H.R. REP. NO. 40(I), supra note 435, at 67,1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 605. Ms. Zabkowicz's comments
could be similarly directed to the Model Act.
437. See supra notes 344-75 and accompanying text (criticizing Act and discussing lack of
deterrent value).
438. 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-5(g) (1988) (amended 1991).
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Model Act, the statute did not provide for any type of compensatory
or punitive damages." 9 Victims of race-based employment discrimi-
nation, however, were able to sue their employers for compensatory
and punitive damages under a Reconstruction-era civil rights statute,
§ 1981 of titie 42, that pre-dated title VII by nearly a century."0 In
1991, Congress concluded that persons who were victims of discrimi-
nation based on factors other than race should also have access to
such remedies." 1  Monetary damages are necessary, Congress
concluded, "to make discrimination victims whole for the terrible
injury to their careers, to their mental and emotional health, and to
their self-respect and dignity."" 2
Congress also recognized the need to provide a deterrent to future
discrimination" because the remedy of back pay simply had not
been a sufficient deterrent."4  In order to deter employers from
discriminating against employees, it was necessary to make them liable
for "all losses-economic and otherwise" that were suffered by the
victims of discrimination."5 There was substantial testimony before
the House Education and Labor Committee in support of the premise
439. Id.
440. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). Section 1981 was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Star. 27, 27 (current version at 42 U.S.c.
§ 1981 (1988)). It provides that "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right... to make and enforce contracts... as is enjoyed by white citizens." Id.
In Johnson v. Railway Exprss Agency, the Supreme Court concluded that § 1981 would support
a federal cause of action for racial discrimination in employment. Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975). As a result, since 1975 employees who have been victims
of racial discrimination have been able to assert both title VII and § 1981 claims. See PERRITr,
supra note 80, at 202 (noting ability of complainant to litigate in several different forums).
Plaintiffs may recover both compensatory and punitive damages under § 1981. See PERRITr,
supra note 101, at 117-19 (discussing remedies available under § 1981).
441. See H.R. REP. No. 40(I), supra note 435, at 65, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 603 ("Gender and
religious discrimination are as reprehensive as race discrimination, and should be treated the
same for purposes of making victims whole, encouraging private enforcement, and deterring
future violations of federal law."). Under title VII, employees are protected against discrimina-
tion based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 incorporated title VII's remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 12117
(Supp. I11991). Consequently, employees who are victims of discrimination based on handicap
are also entitled to the "make-whole" remedy of compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
442. H.R. REP. No. 40(I), supra note 435, at 65, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 603. The House
Education and Labor Committee also observed: "Victims of intentional discrimination often
endure terrible humiliation, pain and suffering, psychological harm and related medical
problems, which in turn cause victims of discrimination to suffer substantial out-of-pocket
medical expenses and other economic losses as a result." Id. at 66, 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 604.
443. H.R. REP. No. 40(I), supra note 435, at 69, 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 607.
444. See H.R. REP. No. 40(I), supra note 435, at 69, 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 607 ("Back pay as
the exclusive monetary remedy under Title VII has not served as an effective deterrent....").
445. H.L REP. No. 40(I), supra note 435, at 69, 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 607. Congress was
proceeding on the theory that "[mlaking employers liable for all losses-economic and
otherwise-which are incurred as a consequence of prohibited discrimination, and which are
proved at trial, will serve as a necessary deterrent to future acts of discrimination." Id.
THE AMERICAN UNiVERSITY LAW REviEW
that allowing compensatory and punitive damages would deter
employer discrimination." 6
Opponents of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, including employers,
argued that allowing compensatory and punitive damages would
"open the floodgates" and lead to many frivolous lawsuits and
astronomical awards. 447  The Committee found the argument
unpersuasive, however, because the history of § 19818 revealed no
evidence of litigants either filing an inordinate number of frivolous
lawsuits or recovering astronomical awards. 449 There are two likely
explanations for the Committee's findings. First, plaintiff's lawyers,
who receive payment only if the plaintiff recovers damages, will not
waste time and money pursuing meritless and unprofitable claims;
4 0
and second, filing a meritless claim could subject the attorney to
sanctions by the court.45'
The House Committee thus concluded that permitting victims of
discrimination to recover damages would "enhance the effectiveness
of title VII by making victims of intentional discrimination whole for
their losses, by deterring future acts of discrimination and by
encouraging private enforcement."4 2 In reaching the compromise
necessary to pass the legislation, however, Congress established
statutory limits on the damages that an employee may recover.453
In an attempt to balance the need to protect employees from
discrimination against the need to protect employers from catastroph-
ic awards and financial ruin, these limits are related to the size of the
employer.454 The goal of such damages, of course, is to punish, but
446. SeeH.R. REP. No. 40(I), supranote 435, at 69-70, 1991 U.S.C.C.-.N. at 607-08 (detailing
support of "[n]umerous courts, commentators and witnesses before the committee" for
compensatory and punitive damages).
447. H.R. REP. No. 40(I), supra note 435, at 70, 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. at 608.
448. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
449. H.R. REP. No. 40(I), supra note 435, at 71, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 609. The House
Committee reviewed a report by the law firm of Shea & Gardener, which found that of the 594
§ 1981 cases decided between 1980 and 1990, compensatory or punitive damages were awarded
in only 69. Id. at 72, 1991 U.S.C.C.N. at 610. In two-thirds of these 69 cases, the total
damages awarded were $50,000 or less. Id. In only four cases did the award exceed $200,000.
Id.
450. See H.R REP. No. 40(I), supra note 435, at 71, 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 609 (calling worry
over frivolous claims "fanciful").
451. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (detailing sanctions available against attorneys who bring meritless
claims).
452. H.R. REP. No. 40(I), supra note 435, at 70, 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 608.
453. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (Supp. IV 1992).
454. Id. Section 1981 was amended in 1991 to allow a plaintiff to recover compensatory and
punitive damages, subject to a cap based on the number of persons employed by the defendant.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a (Supp. IV 1992)). The maximum damages available against an employer with 15 to 100
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not ruin the employer.
The impact of wrongful discharge on an employee is substantially
the same, whether the employee is discharged because of race, sex,
or religion, or other statutorily prohibited discrimination, or for a
nonstatutorily prohibited reason. The same reasons that compelled
Congress to allow victims of statutorily prohibited discrimination to
recover compensatory and punitive damages compel that such
remedies be provided for in the Model Act.455 Unfortunately,
neither proposal was adopted.
The damages suffered by a wrongfully discharged employee can
easily exceed the statutory limits established by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, as illustrated by the Jason Miller case.456 In light of the fact
that our national experience with § 1981 suits strongly suggests that
employers' fears of astronomical verdicts are unfounded,457 the
Model Act should not contain any limits on damages at all. The
statute should allow discharged employees to recover compensatory
and punitive damages calculated in accordance with traditional
common-law standards.458
In recognition of the arduous battle in Congress over the damages
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 459 and in view of the virtual
certainty that neither Congress nor a state legislature is likely to adopt
a statute embracing unlimited compensatory or punitive damages,
however, this Article proposes that the Model Act provide for
compensatory and punitive damages with caps similar to those in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. 4' The Act should, however, tie the caps
to the employer's gross revenue rather than to the number of employ-
ees. Such caps would be more equitable to all parties because the
limits would be related to ability to pay, not to an arbitrary personnel
employees are $50,000; with 101 to 200 employees, $100,000; with 201 to 500 employees,
$200,000; with over 500 employees, $300,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. The damages are recoverable
in addition to the traditional equitable remedies of back pay, front pay, and injunctive relief.
Id.
455. The Study Committee for the Model Act had originally proposed punitive damages for
'malicious violations of public policy ormalicious, bad faith failures to follow the employer's own
policies, procedures, or assurances." MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr § 6(b) (8) cmt.
(Draft February 22, 1989). The February draft also contained a provision allowing an arbitrator
to award liquidated damages not greater than the back pay awarded. Id. § 6(b) (3); cf. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (Supp. IV 1992) (allowing liquidated
damages equal to back pay).
456. See supra notes 367-75 and accompanying text (citing Millercase as example where actual
damages suffered exceeded statutory limits for recoverable damages).
457. See supra note 449 and accompanying text (providing statistics concerning § 1981 suits).
458. See supra notes 82-126 and accompanying text (discussing common law standards
applicable to employment).
459. See supra notes 438-54 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of title VII).
460. See supra notes 452-54 and accompanying text (discussing title VII damages caps).
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count.
Finally, the Model Act should abandon the preference for reinstate-
ment as a remedy.461  It simply does not work. If an employer is
hostile to an employee and wrongfully discharges the employee, a
court or administrative order returning the employee to work will not
change the hostility of the environment. Studies have shown that
reinstated employees do not fare well; they generally stay only a short
time following reinstatement."62 Generally, reinstatement should
not be favored for many of the same reasons that the common law
will not order specific performance of employment contracts.463
Proponents of reinstatement point to its relative success as a remedy
in the arena of labor arbitration.' The proponents overlook,
however, the fact that an employee reinstated as a result of an
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement will continue to
work under the protection of his union. The employer must welcome
the employee back to the fold or face strained relations with the
union representing its employees. In contrast, a nonunion employee
who is wrongfully discharged has no one looking out for her interests
and no ally to support her if the employer continues to deal with her
in a hostile manner. This is not to say that reinstatement should not
be an option if the employee requests it. In some settings it may
work well. It should not, however, be the presumptive remedy for
wrongful discharge.
461. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 7, § 7(b) (3) cmL (describing
reinstatement as preferred remedy under Act).
462. SeegeneraUyWarren H. Chaney, The Reinstatement Remedy Revisited,32 LABORLJ. 357,363-
64 (1981). Professor Chaney studied the effectiveness of reinstatement as a remedy under the
National Labor Relations Act for victims of anti-union discrimination. Id. at 357. Of the 217
employees in the study who were ordered reinstated, 59% refused reinstatement; 88% of those
refusing reinstatement cited fear of employer backlash as the reason. Id. at 359 tbls. I & II. Of
the employees who were reinstated, 86.9% left within the first year. Id. at 360 tbl. IV.
Approximately 65% of those departing cited unfair treatment by the employer as the reason for
leaving. Id. tbl. V; see also Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge,
1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 28-44, 65 (criticizing reinstatement as remedy based upon empirical studies
showing its deficiency in cases of wrongful discharge and proposing, among other things, "a
significant monetary award" as an alternative). Presumably it is because of the problems
inherent in reinstatement that the remedy is not generally favored among Western European
nations. SeeGould, supra note 100, at 414 (noting European practice disfavoring reinstatement).
463. See Leonard, supra note 141, at 685 (discussing reasons common law disfavors specific
performance of contracts).
464. See West, supra note 462, at 38-40 (noting that reinstatement has been successful in
labor arbitration context). In contrast to the general tendency of employees to decline
reinstatement as a remedy under the NLRA, see supra note 462, only 10% to 14% of employees
awarded reinstatement by arbitrators decline to return to work. Id. at 38. Of those who accept
reinstatement, most have remained with the company for two years or more. Id. (citing studies
that found that 47% to 75% of employees reinstated by arbitrator remained with employer at
least two years following reinstatement).
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V. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW FEDERAL STATUTE
In order to protect American employees from wrongful discharge,
Congress should adopt a Federal Employment Termination Act that
is modeled after title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
and that prohibits the discharge of any employee without good cause.
The proposed statute should employ a definition of "good cause"
similar to that of the Model Act.4 In contrast to the Model Act,
however, employers should not be able to arbitrarily set performance
standards."6 All employer actions, including the establishment of
job performance criteria, should be subject to a reasonableness
standard similar to that used in traditional labor arbitration.
6 7
The right to be protected against wrongful discharge is as important
as the right to be protected from invidious employment discrimina-
tion. Therefore, in contrast to the Model Act, the federal act should
prohibit any advance agreements between employers and employees
that would serve to waive the employee's statutory protection. 68 An
employer could, of course, enter into a written contract with an
employee for a finite period of time, in which case there would be no
obligation to retain the employee when the contract expires, so long
as the agreement was entered into in good faith.
In contrast to the Model Act, the federal act should protect all
employees, including state and local government employees and
persons employed by small employers. 9 Many Americans work for
small employers and their economic and personal tragedy in the
event of wrongful discharge is no different from the tragedy endured
by an employee wrongfully discharged from a large multinational
corporation. The economic effect of such claims on small employers
would be tempered by the limits Congress would establish for
compensatory and punitive damages.
4 70
One new provision not contained in either title VII or the Model
Act should be added to the federal act: a requirement of notice. An
employer should be required to give an employee at least thirty days
advance notice of his termination, except where unusual circumstanc-
465. See supra notes 258-86 and accompanying text (discussing Model Act's good cause
requirement).
466. See supra notes 281-85 and accompanying text (discussing freedom of employer under
Model Act to set performance standards).
467. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 266, at 222-36 (explaining reasonable standard of
labor arbitration).
468. See supra notes 359-75 and accompanying text (criticizing waiver provision of Model
Act).
469. Seesupra notes 287-90 and accompanying text (listing employees covered by Model Act).
470. See supra notes 331-39 and accompanying text (discussing limits on remedial measures
of Model Act).
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es make it impractical to give such notice.47' In lieu of the notice,
the employer could provide severance pay for a time equal to the
notice period. Such notice would allow the employee to pursue
internal grievance remedies before leaving his employment, as well as
provide the discharged employee some opportunity to seek new
employment before his old employment terminates.
All of the procedural and administrative aspects of title VII should
apply to cases of wrongful discharge.472 An aggrieved employee
would first file a charge with the EEOC, which would then investigate
the claim. When the agency's investigation has been completed, or
when the statutory investigation period has expired, the employee
would receive a "right to sue" letter, after which she could, if she
chooses, proceed to litigation. The federal scheme would be
integrated with state wrongful termination statutes, including those
patterned after the Model Act, in the same way in which title VII is
currently integrated with state discrimination statutes.473 In contrast
to title VII, however, the federal act should provide an arbitration
option under which the parties could, upon mutual agreement,
arbitrate a wrongful discharge claim.
The proposed statute would provide American employees with
needed protection against wrongful discharge. The availability of
damages would hopefully deter employers who might otherwise
discharge without cause. The administrative structure and procedure
already in place for discrimination claims would provide access to a
tribunal for all employees, regardless of their economic circumstanc-
es.474  It would also provide employers some protection from
specious claims because employees would have to allow the state or
federal agency to investigate the claim before commencing litigation.
In addition, the proposed federal act would protect employers from
the threat of dual claims under title VII and the Model Act when the
wrongful discharge was allegedly for discriminatory reasons.475
Adoption of such a statute would finally provide employees with the
471. Cf. CONVENTION 158, supra note 250. The Convention, like many European statutes,
requires notice prior to termination. Id.
472. See supra notes 405-11 and accompanying text (discussing procedural aspects of title
VII). This would also be consistent with Congress' approach in amending the Americans with
Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (Supp. IV 1992).
473. See supra notes 408-09 and accompanying text (explaining interplay between federal and
state anti-discrimination statutes).
474. See supra notes 405-11 and accompanying text (laying out procedural structures of
discrimination claims).
475. Contra MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Aar, supra note 7, § 2(e) (allowing employee
to assert both claims).
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type of protection that "qualifie[s] as a basic labor standard" and
stands as "the hallmark of a decent society."
4 76
CONCLUSION
The law governing employment in America has moved forward a
great deal in the last century. One hundred years ago, employees had
no right to bargain collectively; they were guaranteed neither a
minimum wage nor a humane schedule, and they enjoyed no
protection against discrimination of any kind. The United States has
recognized both that employees have rights vis-a-vis employers, and
that those rights should be protected by law. Consequently, Congress
has guaranteed the right to bargain collectively and has taken great
strides toward eliminating discrimination. Yet the nation clings
tenaciously to the ancient, ill-conceived doctrine of employment at
will. Millions of Americans serve solely at the pleasure of their
employers, subject to discharge for a good reason, a bad reason, or
no reason at all. Courts have made some inroads into this chaos, but
the time has now come for a statutory solution.
The Model Employment Termination Act marks a step in the right
direction. It is significant that the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws concluded that the employment-at-will
doctrine should be replaced by a statute. In their attempt to draft an
acceptable statute, however, the commissioners have compromised too
much and have created an inadequate statute that provides many
employees with less protection than that which they currently enjoy
under the common law. The Model Act fails to make innocent
victims of wrongful discharge whole and provides no deterrent to
wrongful discharge in the future. Furthermore, crafting the statute
as a Model Act, to be adopted on a state-by-state basis, is an anachro-
nistic solution. In this world of national and multinational corpora-
tions, only a federal statute will effectively address the problem. The
proposed federal statute would treat all wrongful discharges equally,
whether motivated by invidious discrimination, arbitrariness and
capriciousness, or other reasons.
The United States is the only industrialized nation in the world that
does not have national legislation protecting employees from wrongful
discharge.4 77 The time has come for us not only to join our interna-
476. Gould, supra note 9, at 892 n.16a (quoting AFL-CIO Executive Counci4 The Employment-
At-Will Doctrine 3 (Feb. 20, 1987) (press release)).
477. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (explaining lack of national legislation
outlawing wrongful discharge as problem faced uniquely by American workers).
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tional colleagues, but to demonstrate leadership by adopting a federal
statute that truly protects employees from wrongful termination and
provides those employees with meaningful remedies.
